Paradoxes of Sovereignty and Citizenship: Humanitarian Intervention at Home by Allan, Hawa K.
City University of New York Law Review 
Volume 20 Issue 2 
Fall 2017 
Paradoxes of Sovereignty and Citizenship: Humanitarian 
Intervention at Home 
Hawa K. Allan 
Columbia University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/clr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Hawa K. Allan, Paradoxes of Sovereignty and Citizenship: Humanitarian Intervention at Home, 20 CUNY L. 
Rev. 389 (2017). 
Available at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/clr/vol20/iss2/5 
The CUNY Law Review is published by the Office of Library Services at the City University of New York. For more 
information please contact cunylr@law.cuny.edu. 
Paradoxes of Sovereignty and Citizenship: Humanitarian Intervention at Home 
Acknowledgements 
I am grateful to Mark Barenberg, Olati Johnson, Ted Shaw, Kendall Thomas, Patricia Williams, as well as 
Sherally Munshi, Jeremy Pam and Joanna Cuevas Ingram for their helpful comments. I am also indebted 
to members of the Columbia Associates-in-Law Workshop, and attendees of panel presentations of this 
article at the conferences at both the Associations for Law, Culture and Humanities and Law and Society. 
This article is available in City University of New York Law Review: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/clr/vol20/iss2/5 




INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 390
I. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AT HOME . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 397
A. Legal Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 401
1. “Non-Intervention” Principle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 404
a. The Federalist Papers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 405
b. Posse Comitatus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 408
2. Insurrection Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 409
a. 2007 National Defense Authorization
Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 412
b. Reconstruction Act and the Enforcement
Acts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 414
3. Stafford Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 416
B. Just Cause . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 419
1. Enforcing Civil Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 425
2. Suppressing ‘Race Riots’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 432
a. Bleeding Kansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 436
b. Anti-Chinese Expulsion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 438
c. Hurricane Hugo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 440
C. Right Intention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 442
1. Selective Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 444
II. PARADOXES OF SOVEREIGNTY AND CITIZENSHIP . . . . . . . . . 447
A. Sovereignty of the Several States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 448
B. Disparate Responses to U.S. Citizens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 450
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 452
† Hawa K. Allan, Careers-in-Law-Teaching Fellow, Fellow at the Center for the
Study of Law and Culture, Columbia Law School, J.D. I am grateful to Mark
Barenberg, Olati Johnson, Ted Shaw, Kendall Thomas, Patricia Williams, as well as
Sherally Munshi, Jeremy Pam and Joanna Cuevas Ingram for their helpful comments.
I am also indebted to members of the Columbia Associates-in-Law Workshop, and
attendees of panel presentations of this article at the conferences at both the Associa-
tions for Law, Culture and Humanities and Law and Society.
389
390 CUNY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:389
INTRODUCTION
“If I invoked the Insurrection Act against her wishes, the world
would see a male Republican president usurping the authority of a
female Democratic governor by declaring an insurrection in a
largely African American city. That would arouse controversy any-
where. To do so in the Deep South, where there had been centu-
ries of states’ rights tension, could unleash holy hell.”
—George W. Bush, Decision Points1
“George Bush doesn’t care about Black people.”
—Kanye West2
“I am deeply insulted by the suggestion that we allowed American
citizens to suffer because they were black. As I told the press at the
time, ‘The storm didn’t discriminate, and neither will the recovery
effort. When those Coast Guard choppers, many of whom were
first on the scene, were pulling people off roofs, they didn’t check
the color of a person’s skin.’”
—George W. Bush, Decision Points3
“. . . and the fiction of the facts assumes randomness and
indeterminacy.”
—Claudia Rankine, Citizen4
In the days after Hurricane Katrina breached critical levees
and submerged most of New Orleans under water, news reporters
1 GEORGE W. BUSH, DECISION POINTS 321 (2010).
2 See, e.g., Lisa de Moraes, Kanye West’s Torrent of Criticism, Live on NBC, WASH. POST
(Sept. 3, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/
03/AR2005090300165.html [https://perma.cc/Z46B-QUKQ] (“West: I hate the way
they portray us in the media. You see a Black family, it says, ‘They’re looting.’ You see
a white family, it says, ‘They’re looking for food.’ And, you know, it’s been five days
[waiting for federal help] because most of the people are Black. And even for me to
complain about it, I would be a hypocrite because I’ve tried to turn away from the TV
because it’s too hard to watch. I’ve even been shopping before even giving a dona-
tion, so now I’m calling my business manager right now to see what is the biggest
amount I can give, and just to imagine if I was down there, and those are my people
down there. So anybody out there that wants to do anything that we can help — with
the way America is set up to help the poor, the Black people, the less well-off, as slow
as possible. I mean, the Red Cross is doing everything they can. We already realize a
lot of people that could help are at war right now, fighting another way — and they’ve
given them permission to go down and shoot us! . . . George Bush doesn’t care about
Black people!”).
3 BUSH, supra note 1, at 325.
4 CLAUDIA RANKINE, CITIZEN: AN AMERICAN LYRIC 85 (2014).
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referred to the city as a “third world country”5 and to its mostly-
Black residents stranded in attics and other makeshift shelters as
“refugees.”6 Commentators condemned these labels, which they
said betrayed a persistent perception of Black citizens as foreigners
in their own country.7 While corrective monikers surfaced—such
as internally displaced persons, a term for persons dislocated within
their country by, say, civil war or natural disaster8—newscasters
posed more troubling questions, their cameras rolling at home and
minds wandering abroad. “Why no massive airdrop of food and
water?”9 CNN news anchor Soledad O’Brien asked on a broadcast
aired five days after the hurricane hit. “In Banda Aceh, in Indone-
sia, they got food dropped two days after the tsunami struck.”10
The above anecdotes raise questions that are this article’s
point of departure and site of eventual return. How does one rec-
oncile the swift federal response to a “third world country” abroad
relative to the “third world country” at home? Does this Freudian
slip, the rhetorical stripping of Black citizenship, bear any rele-
5 See, e.g., David Carr, The Pendulum of Reporting on Katrina, N.Y. TIMES, (Sept. 5,
2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/05/business/media/the-pendulum-of-re-
porting-on-katrina.html [https://perma.cc/D57W-HQZM] (“It was left to reporters
embedded in the mayhem to let Americans know that a third world country had sud-
denly appeared on the Gulf Coast.”).
6 See, e.g., Joseph B. Treaster & Deborah Sontag, Local Officials Criticize Federal Gov-
ernment Over Response, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 2, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/
02/us/nationalspecial/local-officials-criticize-federal-government-over.html [https://
perma.cc/2QP3-7B96] (“Thousands of refugees from Hurricane Katrina boarded
buses for Houston, but others quickly took their places at the filthy, teeming
Superdome, which has been serving as the primary shelter.”).
7 See, e.g., Calling Katrina Survivors ‘Refugees’ Stirs Debate, NBC NEWS (Sept. 7, 2005,
2:06 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/9232071/ns/us_news-katrina_the_long_road
_back/t/calling-katrina-survivors-refugees-stirs-debate/ [https://perma.cc/RZ3F-
SU69] (“Many, including The Associated Press, have used ‘refugee’ to describe those
displaced by the wrath of Hurricane Katrina. But the choice has stirred anger among
some readers and other critics, particularly in the black community. They have ar-
gued that ‘refugee’ implies that the displaced storm victims, many of whom have been
black, are second-class citizens—or not even Americans.”); Tina Daunt & Robin Ab-
carian, Survivors, Others Take Offense at Word ‘Refugees’, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2005),
http://articles.latimes.com/2005/sep/08/entertainment/et-refugee8 [https://per
ma.cc/6SL8-XEYK].
8 See, e.g., Francis M. Deng (Representative of the Secretary-General on Internally
Displaced Persons), Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc E/CN.4/
1998/53/Add.2, annex (Feb. 11, 1998), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/IDPer-
sons/Pages/Standards.aspx [https://perma.cc/RP3F-Z6QF].
9 See Marc Fisher, Essential Again, AM. JOURNALISM R., Oct.-Nov. 2005, http://www
.ajr.org/article.asp?id=3962 [https://perma.cc/A8PD-9N7B] (quoting Soledad
O’Brien).
10 Id.; see also Transcripts: American Morning, CNN (Sept. 2, 2005, 7:00 AM), http://
transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0509/02/ltm.01.html [https://perma.cc/
XRG8-CD8S].
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vance to the delayed federal response to Hurricane Katrina? While
provocative, these questions are not erudite translations of Kanye
West’s blunt assertion. They also do not deign to infer what lies in
the hearts or minds of federal decision-makers. These questions,
rather, are raised to consider the value of thinking internationally
about domestic concerns – specifically, as this article will explore,
to consider the federal response to crises at home in light of the
conceptual framework developed to guide humanitarian interven-
tion abroad.
Returning, for the moment, to this article’s epigraph, why in
response to a natural disaster had President Bush’s administration
considered declaring an “insurrection”? Why, given this inclina-
tion, had the presidential administration been hesitant to declare
an “insurrection in a largely African American city”?11 The source
of this conundrum is the Insurrection Act of 1807:12 an arcane and
largely-unstudied statute that also happens to be the linchpin of
iconic events that—from pro- and anti-slavery clashes of Bleeding
Kansas, through public school desegregation in the South, to the
Los Angeles riots—epitomize the formation and frustrations of
Black citizenship in the United States. The Insurrection Act, in
brief, authorizes the president to domestically deploy federal
troops with law enforcement powers in the event of an “insurrec-
tion,” “rebellion” or “unlawful combination.”13 In other words, in
the event of some internal crisis or chaos or upheaval, as it were,
the Insurrection Act allows the president to use federal military
force to restore law and order.
While the Insurrection Act provides clear legal authority for the
domestic deployment of federal troops to enforce the law, deter-
mining when to exercise this authority is ambiguous because,
among other things, there is no definition of “insurrection” (or
“rebellion” or “unlawful obstruction”) in the statute.14 Thus, what
constitutes an “insurrection” is in the eye of the beholder – either
11 BUSH, supra note 1, at 321.
12 Insurrection Act of 1807, ch. 39, 2 Stat. 443 (current version at 10 U.S.C. §§ 331-
335 (2006)). The Insurrection Act is part of a bundle of legislation passed over the
course of a century defining the powers of the federal government to call forth state
militias or deploy federal troops, colloquially referred to as the Militia Acts. See gener-
ally Stephen I. Vladeck, Note, Emergency Power and the Militia Acts, 114 YALE L.J. 149,
152-53 n.9 (2004).
13 10 U.S.C. §§ 331-333 (2006).
14 There is some case law defining insurrection, however largely in the context of
insurance litigation. See, e.g., Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
505 F.2d 989, 1005 (2d Cir. 1974) (stating that insurrection requires “an intent to
overthrow a lawfully constituted regime”).
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that of the president, who may unilaterally proclaim an incident as
such, or of the state governor, who may request that the president
make a proclamation of “insurrection,” thereby, in either scenario,
formally triggering the authorization for federal troops to be
deployed with law enforcement powers.15 As an “insurrection” is
effectively what the executive proclaims one to be, it is difficult to
deductively define whether a given incident warrants such a procla-
mation. Thus, the term lends itself to being defined inductively—
that is, by reference to a survey of past incidents that have been
proclaimed as such.
As will be discussed in this article, the Insurrection Act is a
recurring facet of the history of civil rights in the United States—
generally, in scenarios where the federal government has militarily
intervened to enforce the civil rights of Black Americans and/or to
suppress “race riots.” Bleeding Kansas, public school desegrega-
tion, and the Los Angeles riots, noted above, are merely three ex-
amples. Under the Insurrection Act, federal military intervention
was also authorized, for example: during Radical Reconstruction;
to enforce the rights of civil rights protesters to march from Selma
to Montgomery; and, further, to suppress riots that erupted in De-
troit during 1947 and 1963; as well as to put down civil unrest in
the wake of Martin Luther King, Jr.’s assassination in Baltimore
and Washington D.C.
Past invocations of the Insurrection Act, then, reflect a histori-
cal tension over the legitimacy of federal intervention in state af-
fairs where Black citizens are concerned. An overview of the above
incidents reveals that the Insurrection Act has generally been in-
voked unilaterally by the President to enforce civil rights (violated
by state actors), or by request of the state governor in order to sup-
press “race riots” (engaged in by non-state actors)—with interven-
tion in the former instances deemed more politically fraught insofar
as state officials considered it an illegitimate intrusion upon sover-
eignty,16 and in the latter cases—while less politically fraught inso-
far as federal military intervention was requested by state officials—
still nonetheless the subject of controversy.
Accordingly, in the case of Hurricane Katrina, the proposed
invocation of “insurrection” was controversial in light of the state
15 See infra Section I.A.2. on the Insurrection Act; see also Timothy E. Steigelman,
Note, New Model for Disaster Relief: A Solution to the Posse Comitatus Conundrum, 57 NAVAL
L. REV. 105, 113-16 (2009).
16 See infra Section I.B. on Just Cause.
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governor’s objection to federal law enforcement.17 President Bush
was reportedly concerned over media reports of looting and vio-
lence in New Orleans, and therefore did not want to deploy a re-
quested 40,000 federal troops to Louisiana without law
enforcement powers provided under invocation of the Insurrec-
tion Act18—i.e., without the authority to, among other things,
search suspects, seize evidence, make arrests, and, more generally,
use force.19 Then-Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco, for her
part, objected to the proposed invocation of the Insurrection Act.20
Instead, she contended that the president authorize the deploy-
ment of the requested troops and other assistance solely in accor-
dance with an act that had already been triggered21—the Robert T.
Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act.22 The Staf-
17 See, e.g., Manuel Roig-Franzia & Spencer Hsu, Many Evacuated, but Thousands Still
Waiting, WASH. POST (Sept. 4, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/con-
tent/article/2005/09/03/AR2005090301680_pf.html [https://perma.cc/Z8KU-
W5P4] (“Behind the scenes, a power struggle emerged, as federal officials tried to
wrest authority from Louisiana Gov. Kathleen Babineaux Blanco (D). Shortly before
midnight Friday, the Bush administration sent her a proposed legal memorandum
asking her to request a federal takeover of the evacuation of New Orleans, a source
within the state’s emergency operations center said Saturday. The administration
sought unified control over all local police and state National Guard units reporting
to the governor. Louisiana officials rejected the request after talks throughout the
night, concerned that such a move would be comparable to a federal declaration of
martial law.”).
18 See, e.g., Eric Lipton et al., Political Issues Snarled Plans for Troop Aid, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 9, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/09/us/nationalspecial/political-
issues-snarled-plans-for-troop-aid.html [https://perma.cc/2HST-WYZV].
19 Id. (“To seize control of the mission, Mr. Bush would have had to invoke the
Insurrection Act, which allows the president in times of unrest to command active-
duty forces into the states to perform law enforcement duties.”).
20 Spencer S. Hsu et al., Documents Highlight Bush-Blanco Standoff, WASH. POST (Dec.
5, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/12/04/
AR2005120400963_pf.html [https://perma.cc/BTV8-Y7WA] (“Blanco’s reluctance
stemmed from several factors. According to documents and aides, her team was not
familiar with relevant laws and procedures, believed the change would have disrupted
Guard law enforcement operations in New Orleans and mistrusted the Bush team,
which they saw as preoccupied with its own public relations problems and blame
shifting.”).
21 Letter from Kathleen Babineaux Blanco, Governor, La., to George W. Bush,
President, U.S. (Aug. 27, 2005), http://blancogovernor.com/index.cfm?md=news
room&tmp=detail&catID=1&articleID=778&navID=3 [https://perma.cc/A7S8-
D5SF]; see also Blanco’s State of Emergency Letter to President Bush, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Aug.
27, 2005, 12:00 PM), http://www.nola.com/katrina/index.ssf/2005/08/blancos_state
_of_emergency_letter_to_president_bush.html [https://perma.cc/7GQS-3FWC].
22 Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, Pub. L. No.
100-707, 102 Stat. 4689 (1988) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5191). The Staf-
ford Act is the statutory authority for most federal disaster response activities, espe-
cially with regard to FEMA and FEMA programs. The Stafford Act was originally
signed into law on November 23, 1988 as an amendment to the Disaster Relief Act of
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ford Act is generally applied to coordinate the federal response to
natural disasters such as hurricanes, floods and brush fires, (al-
though it can also be applied to respond to “man-made disasters,”
as defined therein). Moreover, and importantly, the Stafford Act
does not authorize any federal troops deployed thereunder to en-
force the law. Thus, a dispatch of federal troops consistent with the
Stafford Act would allow Blanco, as governor, to retain control over
the police powers of the state. A deployment of requested federal
troops under the Insurrection Act, by contrast, would have both
conferred such troops with law enforcement authority and stripped
the governor of her role as ultimate commander-in-chief of the Na-
tional Guard, which would have been federalized under executive
command. In the end, the Louisiana governor prevailed in the fed-
eralism dispute, and the requested additional troops were
deployed five days after the hurricane hit landfall23—well into the
televised crisis in New Orleans.
In the end, as will become clear by international analogy, the
president’s proposed invocation of the Insurrection Act was more
akin to contemplated humanitarian intervention—in one sense, mili-
tary action taken against an insurgency that gravely endangers the
rights and lives of civilians—than humanitarian aid—the provision
of emergency relief to help rescue and shelter civilians amid a dis-
aster. Indeed, akin to the ostensible purpose of humanitarian inter-
vention, the Insurrection Act has been invoked, on the one hand,
to enforce the fundamental rights of persons persecuted by a given
state (or whom such state is unable or unwilling to protect from
persecution), and, on the other, to enforce the law amid a total
breakdown of order—in other words, to enforce civil rights or to
suppress race riots. In light of this analogy, the president’s hesi-
tancy to deploy federal troops to Louisiana under the Insurrection
Act is analogous to the formal inhibitions to engage in humanita-
rian intervention abroad. The contemplated proclamation of “in-
surrection” at home, then, is more analogous to the decision
whether to restore law and order (and thereby save lives) in, say,
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-288, 88 Stat. 143. The most recent reauthorization happened in
2013. Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, Pub. L. No.
113-2, 127 Stat. 4.
23 STEVE BOWMAN ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., HURRICANE KATRINA: DOD DISAS-
TER RESPONSE 1 (2005), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33095.pdf [https://perma
.cc/4VYJ-FSX4] (“The Department of Defense’s Northern Command began its alert
and coordination procedures before Katrina’s landfall, however many deployments
did not reach the affected area until days after.”).
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Somalia in the early 1990s,24 than the decision to help provide aid
and shelter to tsunami victims in Indonesia.25
Following the international analogy to its conclusion—
namely, the paradox of sovereignty and citizenship—this article re-
considers the Katrina crisis and other federal military interventions
at home in light of the pre-existing analytical framework of “just
war” theory. In other words, this article applies the conceptual
framework developed to guide humanitarian intervention
abroad—i.e., questions of legality, necessity, and purpose—to the fed-
eral response to Hurricane Katrina and other “crises” at home.
Though immediately counterintuitive, the conceptual framework is
useful for considering—both retrospectively and prospectively—
domestic federal military intervention. This framework not only
sheds new light on familiar historical events, but also can be a use-
ful aid in the decision-making process regarding future domestic
deployments of federal troops.
As discussed in Part I, similar questions of legality, necessity,
and purpose—or, in “just war” parlance, legal authority, just cause,
and right intention—arise domestically that can be clarified by refer-
ence to the international context. Further, in distinguishing hu-
manitarian intervention—i.e., the use of military force to enforce
fundamental rights and/or law and order—from humanitarian
aid—i.e., the non-combative extension of emergency relief to save
lives—this article considers how the interpretation of a given crisis
at the executive level can influence the nature of federal response.
Accordingly, the following question is presented in Part I: when is
domestic federal intervention framed as humanitarian intervention
versus humanitarian aid? Moreover, in considering the purpose (or
intention) of federal military intervention, Part I of this article ex-
amines the potential for selective enforcement where domestic hu-
manitarian intervention and aid are concerned.
As discussed in Part II of this article, an overview of domestic
federal military intervention in light of “just war” theory uncovers
two paradoxes—one of sovereignty and another of citizenship. As for
sovereignty, while it would appear that federal military infringe-
ment upon the sovereignty of the several states during a crisis
should be relatively uncontroversial given the clear legal authority
24 See, e.g., Somalia, 1992-1993, U.S. DEP’T STATE: OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN, https:/
/history.state.gov/milestones/1993-2000/somalia [https://perma.cc/4WFX-PXS9].
25 See, e.g., Tsunami Aid: Who’s Giving What, BBC NEWS (Jan. 27, 2005, 8:40 AM),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4145259.stm [https://perma.cc/4EBQ-
K9L5] (“Washington also sent military assistance involving 12,600 personnel, 21 ships,
14 cargo planes and more than 90 helicopters.”).
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to do so, the potential political fallout of doing such renders the
sovereignty of the states far less permeable than would be
imagined—perhaps akin to that of a foreign state. As to citizen-
ship, while the federal government’s responsibility to protect all
citizens within United States borders is unequivocal and expected
to be fulfilled uniformly, an overview of the nature of federal mili-
tary intervention in response to a given domestic crisis raises the
question whether, where Black citizens have been concerned, the
primary intention to restore law and order has trumped any inten-
tion to save lives.
I. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AT HOME
Though a single definition of “humanitarian intervention” has
not emerged, the term is generally understood to refer to the use
or threat of use of military force by one or more states within an-
other state for ostensibly humanitarian purposes.26 Humanitarian
intervention is at times construed to encompass the provision of
emergency relief by one or more states to another in order to help
rescue and shelter civilians amid a disaster—a relatively uncon-
troversial activity referred to herein as humanitarian aid.27 Indeed,
U.S. provision of emergency aid to Indonesia in the wake of the
tsunami is an example of such aid.28 Used here, and as illustrated
in the table below, “humanitarian intervention” describes a rela-
tively controversial activity; it refers to the military intervention of
one or more states into another (1) for the ostensible purpose of
26 See, e.g., Ryan Goodman, Humanitarian Intervention and Pretexts for War, 100 AM. J.
INT’L L. 107, 107 n.2 (2006), http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/rgoodman/pdfs/
RGoodmanHumanitarianInterventionPretextsforWar.pdf [https://perma.cc/95TB-
8TST] (“A conventional definition of ‘humanitarian intervention’ is ‘the threat or use
of force by a state, group of states, or international organization primarily for the
purpose of protecting the nationals of the target state from widespread deprivations
of internationally recognized human rights.” (quoting SEAN D. MURPHY, HUMANITA-
RIAN INTERVENTION: THE UNITED NATIONS IN AN EVOLVING WORLD ORDER 11-12
(1996))).
27 See, e.g., Kate Mackintosh, Beyond the Red Cross: The Protection of Independent Hu-
manitarian Organizations and Their Staff in International Humanitarian Law, in INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE: A CROSSCUT THROUGH LEGAL ISSUES
PERTAINING TO HUMANITARIANISM 33, 36 (Hans-Joachim Heintze & Andrej Zwitter
eds., 2011); Deliver Humanitarian Aid, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/sec-
tions/what-we-do/deliver-humanitarian-aid/index.html [https://perma.cc/F8KT-
RCHW].
28 Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, White House of President George W.
Bush, Fact Sheet: Continuing Report for Tsunami Relief (Feb. 9, 2005), https://ge-
orgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/02/20050209-20.html
[https://perma.cc/DYW5-WRAU] (“The Defense Department has been providing vi-
tal supplies and logistics to the humanitarian effort since December 30.”).
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enforcing the human rights of persons persecuted by the target
state or whom the target state is unable or unwilling to protect
from persecution by some third party, or, further, (2) amid a total
breakdown of law and order. Prior to the events of September 11,
2001, examples of such interventions made by the United States
through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (“NATO”) or oth-
erwise include those in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Somalia;29 moreover,
an example of a situation that, in hindsight, has been deemed to
warrant such intervention is the genocide in Rwanda.30
29 See generally The Evolution of NATO, 1988-2001, U.S. DEP’T STATE: OFFICE OF THE
HISTORIAN, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1993-2000/evolution-of-nato
[https://perma.cc/D3MU-YFZU]; see also The War in Bosnia, 1992-1995, U.S. DEP’T
STATE: OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1993-2000/
bosnia [https://perma.cc/Z2M7-HGVK]; Somalia, 1992-1993, U.S. DEP’T STATE: OF-
FICE OF THE HISTORIAN, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1993-2000/somalia
[https://perma.cc/J445-Z9N6]; Peace Support Operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
NATO (Sept. 7, 2015, 2:52 PM), http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52122
.htm [https://perma.cc/772M-DPCD]; NATO’s Role in Kosovo, NATO (Sept. 6, 2016,
12:23 PM), http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_48818.htm [https://perma
.cc/Q2GK-2L62].
30 See, e.g., ALAN J. KUPERMAN, THE LIMITS OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: GENO-
CIDE IN RWANDA 109 (2001) (“A realistic U.S. military intervention launched as soon as
President Clinton could have determined that genocide was being attempted in
Rwanda would not have averted the genocide. It could, however, have saved an esti-
mated 75,000 to 125,000 Tutsi from death, about 15 to 25 percent of those who ulti-
mately lost their lives, in addition to tens of thousands of Hutu.”); Scott R. Feil, Could
5,000 Peacekeepers Have Saved 500,000 Rwandans?: Early Intervention Reconsidered, ISD
REP., April 1997, at 1, 1-5, https://isd.georgetown.edu/sites/isd/files/ISDreport_
Could_5000_Feil.pdf [https://perma.cc/6QLB-PAYW]; Ghosts of Rwanda: America’s Re-
sponse to the Genocide, PBS.ORG: FRONTLINE (Apr. 1, 2004), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/
pages/frontline/shows/ghosts/themes/response.html [https://perma.cc/KEC4-
G9JJ]. For more background on the institutional failures that prevented intervention
in the Rwandan Genocide, see Matthew Levinger, Why the U.S. Government Failed to
Anticipate the Rwandan Genocide of 1994: Lessons for Early Warning and Prevention, 9 GE-
NOCIDE STUD. & PREVENTION, no. 3, 2016, at 33, http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1362&context=gsp [https://perma.cc/Z99K-D35R].
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TABLE 1.1 DOMESTIC ANALOGIES TO HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION & AID
International Domestic Federal Purpose of
Intervention Intervention Intervention
Humanitarian Insurrection Act Use of Military Force




Humanitarian Aid Stafford Act Extension of
Emergency Relief in
Order to Save Lives
and Alleviate Suffering
Legal scholars, moral philosophers, as well as both crafters
and critics of U.S. foreign policy have long theorized about and
debated the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention in the inter-
national context.31 The legitimacy of such intervention has been at
issue in light of the general non-intervention principle—whereby the
sovereignty of a given state is inviolable absent certain exceptional
circumstances.32 While legal scholars of humanitarian intervention
have predominantly considered the requisite exceptional authority
of a given state to infringe upon the sovereignty of another state,
under the UN Charter and otherwise,33 moral philosophers have
attempted to establish criteria for determining those instances
where humanitarian concerns trump the integrity of state sover-
eignty.34 Furthermore, moral philosophers, as well as commenta-
tors on U.S. foreign policy, have contemplated the purity of
31 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 703 cmt. e, 905
(AM. LAW INST. 1987); Alex J. Bellamy, Responsibility to Protect or Trojan Horse? The Crisis
in Darfur and Humanitarian Intervention after Iraq, ETHICS & INT’L AFFAIRS, October 1,
2005, at 31, 50-54, http://teachers.colonelby.com/krichardson/Grade%2012/Carle-
ton%20-%20Int%20Law%20Course/Week%207/R2P%20or%20Trojan.pdf [https://
perma.cc/SR4F-KPDX]; Goodman, supra note 26; Louis Henkin, Kosovo and the Law of
“Humanitarian Intervention”, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 824 (1999); Rachel VanLandingham,
Politics or Law? The Dual Nature of the Responsibility to Protect, 41 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y
63 (2012); With Good Intentions: U.S. Foreign Policy & Humanitarian Intervention, CATO
INST. (Mar. 14, 2006), https://www.cato.org/events/good-intentions-us-foreign-pol-
icy-humanitarian-intervention [https://perma.cc/YWT5-5X94].
32 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), Declaration on Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with
the Charter of the United Nations (Oct. 24, 1970), http://www.un-documents.net/
a25r2625.htm [https://perma.cc/63FM-T6L3].
33 See, e.g., MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH
HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS 61 (1977).
34 Id. at 107-08.
400 CUNY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:389
motives guiding humanitarian intervention. The former have elab-
orated, among the established moral criteria for such intervention,
that intervening states use military force – in all instances warrant-
ing such – for purely humanitarian purposes;35 the latter have re-
lied on empirical analyses to point out that, in practice, such
intervention has been selectively conducted by states pursuing in-
terests that are not solely humanitarian in nature.36 In sum, and
borrowing terminology also used in “just war” theory, domestic fed-
eral military intervention has largely considered questions of (1)
legality, or proper (i.e., legal) authority to intervene; (2) necessity,
or whether the relevant incident constitutes a just cause warranting
intervention; and, (3) purpose, that is, independent of the stated
cause or goal of a given intervention, whether the intervention is
made with the right intention.37
As an initial matter, principles developed to guide humanita-
rian intervention abroad are instructive at home insofar as they
contextualize and assist an analysis of the decision-making process en-
tailed in authorizing domestic federal military intervention. Taking
the delayed federal response to Hurricane Katrina as a key exam-
ple and cautionary tale, it will become clear that decisions made at
the executive level as to whether to invoke the Insurrection Act—
i.e., engage in humanitarian intervention at home—are not only
influenced by the same kind of concerns that arise when contem-
plating humanitarian intervention abroad, but can also hinder or
distort the federal response to domestic disaster. As summarized in
the table below, this conceptual framework—questions of legal au-
thority, just cause, and right intention—is applied in Part I to re-
consider domestic federal military intervention. This conceptual
exercise will elaborate on federal military intervention in theory and
practice. The theory, as will be discussed in subsection A.1., is
grounded in legal authority—that is, the legal framework authoriz-
ing domestic federal military intervention in the exceptional event
of an “insurrection.” The consideration of practice as discussed in
subsections A.2. and A.3., will be illustrated by each of those inci-
dents deemed to warrant a just cause—i.e., events deemed to be
“insurrections”—and by a consideration of right intention—i.e., the
disparate purposes of “crisis” response set forth in the Insurrection
35 Id.
36 See, e.g., id. at 102-03.
37 For an overview of the definitional components of “just war” – and in particular,
jus ad bellum, which refers to the theory of justification for initiating a war – see War,
STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (May 3, 2016), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/war/
#JusAdBell [https://perma.cc/T25A-UV3J].
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and Stafford Acts, respectively, and the possibility of selective en-
forcement as to which legislation is applied to respond to a given
event. This analysis will ultimately show how the legal framework
governing domestic federal military intervention betrays the
fraught relation between race and state sovereignty, and, further,
raises questions of disparate responses to disaster as to different
subsets of citizens. In other words, this exercise will summarily re-
veal paradoxes of sovereignty and citizenship.
TABLE 1.2 DOMESTIC APPLICATION OF CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Conceptual Humanitarian Humanitarian
Framework Intervention Abroad Intervention at Home
Non-Intervention General Inviolability of General Inviolability of
Principle State Sovereignty the Sovereignty of the
Several States as to
Implied Police Powers
Legal Authority UN Charter, Chapter Insurrection Act (and
VII Article IV, Sections 2
& 4, Article I, Section
8, and Article II,
Section 2 of the
Constitution)
Just Cause Grave Violation of Violation of
Human Rights by Constitutional Rights
State Actors, or by by State Actors, or by
Non-State Actors that Non-State Actors that
Overwhelms Capacity Overwhelms the
of State to Respond Capacity of any of the
Several States to
Respond
Right Intention Theoretical: Solely Theoretical: Solely
Humanitarian Humanitarian
Purposes Empirical Purposes Empirical
Trend: State- Trend: State-
Sponsored Human Sponsored Civil Rights
Rights Violation; Violations; ‘Race Riots’
Insurgency by Non- Engaged in by Non-




The conceptual exercise employed in this article—considering
federal military intervention at home in light of the analysis devel-
oped to guide humanitarian intervention abroad – could appear
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incongruous where legal authority is concerned. Indeed, as dis-
cussed further, while the legal authority of one state to militarily
intervene in the affairs of another state is equivocal, the same au-
thority domestically, by contrast, is unequivocal. The “non-inter-
vention” principle in the international context establishes a high
threshold for one state to violate the sovereignty of another—a
threshold that is not only politically fraught but also legally
vague.38 However, as will become clear, there is an analogous “non-
intervention” principle in effect in the U.S. federalist system of gov-
ernment, which renders federal military intervention politically
fraught regardless of the unambiguous legal authorization of the
executive to engage in it.
In the international context, the UN Charter is the primary
source of the legal authority of one or more member states to en-
gage in humanitarian intervention.39 However, such authority is es-
tablished in the Charter as an exception to a general rule that
prohibits a given state from intervening in the internal affairs of
another. Specifically, the UN Charter sets forth a “non-intervention
principle” enshrining the sanctity of state sovereignty, stating in Ar-
ticle 2(7) that “nothing . . . shall authorize the United Nations to
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic juris-
diction of any state.”40 Member states, accordingly, must not violate
the territorial integrity of another state except for reasons of self-
defense or, arguably, to maintain international peace and secur-
ity.41 While some scholars have cited other sources of international
law that legally authorize humanitarian intervention42—including,
for example, the obligation to prevent and punish genocide under
the Genocide Convention43—it is clear that any incidents internal
to a given state that legally warrant intervention constitute excep-
tions to the general rule to respect state sovereignty.
38 See generally Jane Stromseth, Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention: The Case for In-
cremental Change, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND POLITICAL DI-
LEMMAS 232, 242 (J.L. Holzgrefe & Robert O. Keohane eds., 2003).
39 Compare U.N. Charter arts. 41-42 with U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶¶ 4, 7.
40 U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 7.
41 U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.
42 See, e.g., Bartram S. Brown, Humanitarian Intervention at a Crossroads, 41 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1683 (2000); Christopher Greenwood, Humanitarian Intervention: The
Case of Kosovo, 2002 FINNISH Y.B. INT’L L. 141, http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/21492/1/Hu-
manitarian_intervention_the_case_of_Kosovo(LSERO).pdf [https://perma.cc/3NYB-
8BXF].
43 United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, 280, https://treaties.un.org/doc/publica-
tion/unts/volume%2078/volume-78-i-1021-english.pdf [https://perma.cc/5YBW-
KF4S].
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Again, similar quandaries of legal authority may not be imme-
diately thought to occur domestically. For one, the responsibility of
the U.S. government to protect non-citizens abroad is of dubious
legal certainty and politically fraught;44 by contrast, the same obli-
gation at home is legally unequivocal and, moreover, presumably
politically uncontroversial. However, upon further reflection, it is
clear that the degree of autonomy reserved to the several states in
the federalist system of U.S. government is a domestic analogue to
the sanctity of state sovereignty enshrined in the U.N. Charter.
Indeed, federalism entails a separation of powers between the
federal and state governments—the latter of which are entitled to a
degree of autonomy, (or, as popularly termed, “states” rights’), that
is analogous to the international concept of “state sovereignty.”
Certainly, there are instances in which federal and state govern-
ments have overlapping powers; however, key to a consideration of
humanitarian intervention at home is the constitutional delegation
of police powers to the several states, (subject, of course, to speci-
fied exceptions).
The constitutional and legislative manifestations of the “non-
intervention principle,” as well as codified exceptions to this princi-
ple, are discussed in this section. First, this section gives an over-
view of the limits on the domestic deployment of federal troops
enumerated in the U.S. Constitution, including a brief discussion
of anxieties documented in The Federalist Papers45 about the threat
of establishing a federal military force. Next, this section discusses
the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878,46 post-Civil-War legislation that
generally prohibits the domestic deployment of federal troops to
enforce the law. Further, this section discusses a relevant exception
to the Posse Comitatus Act—the Insurrection Act, which is the do-
mestic analogue to legally authorized humanitarian intervention.
Finally, this section discusses the Stafford Act, which is legislation
that authorizes the federal administration of humanitarian aid to
the several states.
44 Compare MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT & RICHARD S. WILLIAMSON, THE UNITED STATES
AND R2P: FROM WORDS TO ACTION (2013), https://www.ushmm.org/m/img/201306
13-The-United-States-and-R2P.pdf [https://perma.cc/8S9W-PLMH], with STEVEN
GROVES, THE HERITAGE FOUND., THE U.S. SHOULD REJECT THE U.N. “RESPONSIBILITY TO
PROTECT” DOCTRINE, (2008), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2008/05/
the-us-should-reject-the-un-responsibility-to-protect-doctrine [https://perma.cc/
3UHV-SYTH].
45 THE FEDERALIST PAPERS (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
46 Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, ch. 263, § 15, 20 Stat. 145, 152 (current version at
18 U.S.C. § 1385 (1994)).
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1. “Non-Intervention” Principle
Analogous to the non-intervention principle in the interna-
tional context, the Constitution, as a general rule, reserves to the
several states the power to enforce the law within their respective
territories. The Tenth Amendment reserves to the several states, or
to the people, any powers not expressly granted to the federal gov-
ernment or not otherwise prohibited by the Constitution—includ-
ing implied police powers.47 The implied police powers of the state
have been construed as those exercised to promote and maintain
the health, safety, morals, and general welfare of the public—pow-
ers which are understood to authorize each of the several states to
enforce law and order within their territories. The laws of the sev-
eral states, moreover, are fairly uniform in establishing the gover-
nor, chief executive of the state, as commander-in-chief of the state
militia—which, in modern day, has been formally reconstituted as
the National Guard.48
The Constitution, however, also establishes a framework for
the federal exercise of police power in exceptional circumstances.
Article IV, Section 4 of the Constitution guaranteeing a republican
form of government may be interpreted to authorize the domestic
deployment of federal troops in furtherance of such guarantee;49
further, Article IV, Section 4 regarding the federal obligation to
protect the several states from domestic violence may be inter-
preted to authorize the same.50 As for the federal government’s
exceptional authorization to commandeer state military forces, Arti-
cle I, Section 8, Clause 15 of the Constitution authorizes Congress
to call forth the state militia to execute the laws of the union—i.e.,
federal law—to suppress insurrections and repel invasions.51 Fur-
ther, under Article II, Section 2, Clause 1 the president is the com-
mander-in-chief of the U.S. army and navy, as well as of the militia
of the several states when called into the actual service of the federal
government.52 In tandem, these provisions allow for state militia,
when called forth by Congress, to be federalized under presidential
command. In other words, the president is authorized to federal-
ize, and thereby usurp, a state governor’s command over state mili-
47 U.S. CONST. amend. X.
48 53 AM. JUR. 2D Military & Civil Defense § 30 (2017).
49 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
50 Id.
51 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
52 Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
2017] PARADOXES OF SOVEREIGNTY AND CITIZENSHIP 405
tia—as presently constituted, the National Guard—and, further,
deploy such troops domestically in order to enforce the law.
As discussed in this subsection, Congress delegated to the
president its authority to call forth the state militia to enforce the
law in, among other legislation, the Insurrection Act and related
statutes collectively referred to as the Militia Acts.53 Before elabo-
rating on the legislative authority for the president to use federal
(and in the case of the state militia, federalized) military force do-
mestically, it is useful to briefly consider the general constitutional
rule and its exceptions in light of initial concerns over the estab-
lishment of a federal military documented in The Federalist Pa-
pers54—namely, anxieties over the threat of standing armies and
the potential abuse of federal power.
a. The Federalist Papers
The Federalist Papers55 set forth the theoretical underpinning
for the domestic non-intervention principle, namely anti-federalist
fears about the potential use of the federal military to subjugate
the peoples of the several states. In allaying such fears, federalists—
Alexander Hamilton and James Madison, in particular—mini-
mized the perceived threat posed by a federal military, whose do-
mestic deployment they presumed would be limited to protecting
the republic from invasion and suppressing any insurrections in
one or more of the several states.56 Moreover, they extolled the
potency of the state militia, which they contended would be suffi-
ciently robust to combat any abuse of federal military power.57
53 See, e.g., Vladeck, supra note 12, at 152-53 n.9 (“The five statutes are the Calling
Forth Act of 1792, ch. 28, 1 Stat. 264 (repealed 1795); the Militia Act of 1795, ch. 36, 1
Stat. 424 (repealed in part 1861 and current version at 10 U.S.C. §§ 331-335 (2000));
the Insurrection Act of 1807, ch. 39, 2 Stat. 443 (current version at 10 U.S.C. §§ 331-
335 (2000)); the Suppression of the Rebellion Act of 1861, ch. 25, 12 Stat. 281 (cur-
rent version at 10 U.S.C. §§ 331-335 (2000)); and specific parts of the Ku Klux Klan
(Civil Rights) Act of 1871, ch. 22, §§ 3-4, 17 Stat. 13, 14-15 (expired in part 1873 and
current version at 10 U.S.C. § 333).”). Id. at 159-67.
54 THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, supra note 45.
55 Id.
56 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 29 (Alexander Hamilton), NO. 46 (James Madison).
57 It is worth noting, here, an analogy to the international context – namely, early
discussions over the contemplated authority of the UN Security Council to use mili-
tary force in order to “maintain or restore international peace and security.” U.N.
Charter art. 39. Similar to the adjudged weakness of the American confederation of
sovereign states as compared to the proposed federalist system of government, found-
ing members of the UN determined that the establishment of an armed force com-
mandeered by the Security Council was a marked improvement over the former
system under the League of Nations—which lacked its own military force and de-
pended solely on the armed forces of state members.
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Before elaborating on the non-intervention principle set forth
in The Federalist Papers and its relation to insurrection, it is useful to
first delineate the “militia,” as referenced therein and in the Con-
stitution, from the distinct and at times encapsulating “federal mili-
tary.” “Militia” is referred to in The Federalist Paper No. 29 as the
military forces of the several states subject to the direction of state
officials.58 Such militia, further, was to be distinct from the body of
troops that would constitute the proposed federal military—i.e.,
those bodies of armed forces including the army and the navy,
among others.
The Federalist Papers also contemplated the role of the federal
military in suppressing insurrections. As Alexander Hamilton ex-
pressed in The Federalist Paper No. 28, regardless of the ultimate
form of government, it would be necessary to have “a force consti-
tuted differently from the militia, to preserve the peace of the com-
munity and to maintain the just authority of the laws against those
violent invasions of them which amount to insurrections and rebel-
lions.”59 Though Hamilton contemplated that a federal military
would be the force of first resort for suppressing insurrection, he
also considered the deployment of state militia as a supplemental
force in such a scenario: “In times of insurrection, or invasion, it
would be natural and proper that the militia of a neighboring State
should be marched into another, to resist a common enemy, or to
guard the republic against the violence of faction or sedition.”60
Apart from the emphasized need for a federal military to sup-
press insurrection, the role and potency of this force was generally
downplayed relative to the state militia and other armed mobiliza-
tions of peoples within the several states. James Madison, for exam-
ple, attempted to dispel any concerns over the potential for the
abuses of a federal military force by asserting that the state militia
would be sufficiently armed and numerous to repel an army that
served at the will of the federal government.61 Similar assertions
were made about the relative potency of state and federal military
forces in discussions about the unorganized militia—i.e., self-mobil-
58 THE FEDERALIST NO. 29 (Alexander Hamilton). It was proposed therein that the
federal government provide for the organizing, arming, and disciplining of the mili-
tia, and for governing them when they are in federal service. However, the appoint-
ment of officers and the authority of training the militia according to a discipline
prescribed by Congress would be reserved to the several states.
59 THE FEDERALIST NO. 28, at 179 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
60 THE FEDERALIST NO. 29, at 187 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (emphasis added).
61 THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, at 299 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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ized collectives of armed civilians. Hamilton presumed that armed
state citizens who exercised “that original right of self-defense
which is paramount to all positive forms of government” would be
better equipped to resist the “usurpations of national rulers” than
that of state representatives.62 He further surmised that any collec-
tive of armed civilians would be woefully unorganized and ill-
equipped to combat the unjust encroachment of state power, but
not that of federal power.63
Finally, while promoting a system of military checks and bal-
ances,64 it was assumed in The Federalist Papers that the federal gov-
ernment would have the authority to commandeer state militias in
order to enforce the law. Hamilton rejected as “absurd”65 that the
president would be prohibited from calling out the Posse Comita-
tus—in Latin, ‘the power of a county’,66 and, colloquially, a body of
armed men summoned by a sheriff to enforce the law67—because
the then-proposed Constitution did not expressly authorize such a
power.68 For one, Hamilton submitted that the inherent loyalty of
members of the ‘militia’ to state officials would check any federal
abuse of authority when the president commandeered such
forces.69 Further, to the extent that such a notion was considered a
danger to public safety, Hamilton preemptively asked:
Where in the name of common-sense, are our fears to end if we
may not trust our sons, our brothers, our neighbors, our fellow-
citizens? What shadow of danger can there be from men who
are daily mingling with the rest of their countrymen and who
62 THE FEDERALIST NO. 28, at 180 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
63 THE FEDERALIST NO. 29, at 185 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
64 THE FEDERALIST NO. 28, at 181 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (“[T]he general government [would] at all times stand ready to check the usur-
pations of the state governments, and these [would] have the same disposition to-
wards the general government.”).
65 THE FEDERALIST NO. 29, at 183 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
66 See Posse Comitatus, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dic-
tionary/posse%20comitatus [https://perma.cc/774A-UNTZ]; see also Hawa Allan, By
What Authority?, BAFFLER (Nov. 23, 2016), http://thebaffler.com/latest/insurrection-
hawa-allan [https://perma.cc/AW7A-5XCZ].
67 See ERIC V. LARSON & JOHN E. PETERS, RAND CORP., PREPARING THE U.S. ARMY
FOR HOMELAND SECURITY: CONCEPTS, ISSUES, AND OPTIONS 243 (2001), https://www
.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1251/MR1251.AppD
.pdf [https://perma.cc/5HDV-PQ83] (quoting the Black’s Law Dictionary definition
of posse comitatus).
68 THE FEDERALIST NO. 29, at 183-84 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
69 Id.
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participate with them in the same feelings, sentiments, habits
and interests? What reasonable cause of apprehension can be
inferred from a power in the Union to prescribe regulations for
the militia and to command its services when necessary, while
the particular States are to have the sole and exclusive appointment
of the officers?70
b. Posse Comitatus
Despite Hamilton’s incredulity, the Posse Comitatus Act—a
legislative response to the abovementioned “shadow of danger”—
was later enacted. As discussed infra, Posse Comitatus was passed in
1878 as a response to federal military intervention in Southern
states during Reconstruction.71 Specifically, Posse Comitatus codi-
fied the hitherto unwritten agreement made as part of the Com-
promise of 1877, which secured the election of Rutherford B.
Hayes to the office of president in exchange for the removal of
federal troops from former Confederate states.72 In short, Posse
Comitatus became the legislative manifestation of the domestic
“non-intervention” principle.
The text of Posse Comitatus as currently codified is as follows:
Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized
by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the
Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to exe-
cute the laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than two years, or both.73
The precise language of Posse Comitatus renders the statute a pal-
liative rather than a cure-all because, despite the general prohibi-
tion on the domestic deployment of federal troops to enforce the
law, the statute expressly authorizes exceptions to this rule “author-
ized by the Constitution or Act of Congress,” which include the
Insurrection Act, discussed below.74
As for the practical import of Posse Comitatus, the statute has
been interpreted by federal district courts to disallow the “active”
use of federal or federalized armed forces to enforce the law—
prohibiting such troops from making arrests, seizing evidence, con-
ducting searches, investigating crimes, and interviewing wit-
70 Id. at 186 (emphasis added).
71 Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, ch. 263, § 15, 20 Stat. 145, 152 (current version at
18 U.S.C. § 1385 (1994)).
72 Andrew Buttaro, The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 and the End of Reconstruction, 47
ST. MARY’S L.J. 135, 136, 161 (2015).
73 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (1994) (emphasis added).
74 Id. Other exceptions include the National Defense Authorization Act.
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nesses.75 However, other federal district courts have interpreted
Posse Comitatus not to prohibit the “passive” engagement of federal
and federalized troops in law enforcement activity—i.e., the “mere
presence” of such troops for reporting purposes, preparation of
contingency plans, advice or recommendations given to civilian law
enforcement authorities and the provision of materials or equip-
ment to such authorities.76
It is worth noting, here, the analogous operational limitations
that generally apply to the U.S. military when facilitating the provi-
sion of humanitarian aid abroad—that is, when intervening in the
affairs of a sovereign state, typically by local invitation, in order to
provide emergency relief in the aftermath of a disaster that over-
whelms the capacity of such state to respond. In brief, the U.S. mili-
tary plays a supporting role in such missions, restricted not only to
complementing the activities of the United States Agency for Inter-
national Development (“USAID”) and non-governmental organiza-
tions, but, further and importantly, supplementing the efforts of
the civilian authorities of the state to which relief is being provided.
2. Insurrection Act
The Insurrection Act is among the legislative exceptions to the
non-intervention principle enumerated in the Constitution and
later codified in Posse Comitatus. The domestic analogue to an au-
thorization of humanitarian intervention abroad, the Insurrection
Act, in brief, authorizes the president to domestically deploy fed-
eral troops with law enforcement powers. As the Insurrection Act
lacks any legislative history, this subsection will detail the more
technical aspects of the legislation—including its antecedents and
other related statutes, such as those enacted to allow for federal
military intervention to suppress the Ku Klux Klan and enforce the
75 See, e.g., United States v. Red Feather, 392 F. Supp. 916, 925 (D.S.D. 1975).
76 This distinction between active and passive law enforcement was articulated in
decisions in a number of federal cases brought by members of the American Indian
Movement (AIM) who challenged the use of federal military intervention to disband
their armed occupation of the village of Wounded Knee in South Dakota. In at least
two such decisions, federal courts overturned the criminal convictions of AIM defend-
ants involved in the occupation, finding that, absent any presidential proclamation
authorizing such use under the Insurrection Act, they were apprehended in violation
of Posse Comitatus with the active engagement of federal armed forces. See, e.g.,
United States v. Red Feather, 392 F. Supp. 916, 923 (D.S.D. 1975) (“It is clear from
the legislative history of 18 U.S.C. § 1385 and the above cases, the intent of Congress
in enacting this statute and by using the clause ‘uses any part of the Army or the Air
Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise’, was to prevent the direct active use of federal
troops, one soldier or many, to execute the laws. Congress did not intend to prevent
the use of Army or Air Force materiel or equipment in aid of execution of the laws.”).
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Fifteenth Amendment. As this subsection will begin to demon-
strate, the Insurrection Act has been a site of contention over theo-
retical federalist principles, and, in practice, has played a key role
in federal enforcement of the civil rights of Black citizens.
The Insurrection Act is among the legislation referred to as
the Militia Acts, which, among other things, collectively defined
the form and function of the state militia.77 With the enactment of
the Militia Act of 1903 (also known as the Dick Act), the state mili-
tia was reconfigured as the modern-day National Guard.78 The
Dick Act established the current system of administration of state
militia—i.e., whereby the National Guard is a reserve force that,
under a given state constitution, generally serves at the will of the
state governor and, further, is subject to being ‘called forth’ into
federal service by the president.
The Militia Acts also set forth the terms and conditions regard-
ing executive authority to engage in “humanitarian intervention”
in one or more of the several states. The Insurrection Act—which
remains in force to date79—authorizes the president to deploy
both state militia and federal armed forces to respond to specified
internal disturbances. Recalling Article I, Section 8 of the Constitu-
tion, the Insurrection Act authorizes the president to call forth the
militia, as well as federal armed forces, in order to suppress insur-
rection and/or enforce federal law.80 The Insurrection Act gives
the president considerable discretion to determine when a given
77 As to form, the first of this series of legislation, titled the 1792 Uniform National
Militia Act, provided that “each and every free able-bodied white male citizen of the
respective states” between the ages of 18 and 45 was enrolled in the militia, and set
forth requirements for how state officials were to organize and arm its members. Mili-
tia Act of 1792, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 271, 272. This early definition was altered with subse-
quent legislation that shifted more control to the federal government in designating
precisely how state militia was to be organized and equipped (thereby limiting discre-
tion of state officials as to such matters), and, further, expanding the criteria for
membership – including the racial desegregation of the militia in 1862. Militia Act of
1862, ch. 201, 12 Stat. 597.
78 Militia Act of 1903, ch. 196, 32 Stat. 775, 775.
79 10 U.S.C. §§ 331-335 (1956).
80 Id. § 331 (“Whenever there is an insurrection in any State against its govern-
ment, the President may, upon the request of its legislature or of its governor if the
legislature cannot be convened, call into Federal service such of the militia of the
other States, in the number requested by that State, and use such of the armed forces,
as he considers necessary to suppress the insurrection.”). Ability to repel invasion is
mysteriously absent in the Act, though it is likely that such authorization is inherent.
Cf. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15 (“To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute
the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions[.]”).
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internal disturbance rises to the level of an “insurrection”81 that
warrants federal military intervention. While Section 331 of the
currently-in-force Insurrection Act conditions such intervention
upon the request of the governor or legislature of the target state,
Sections 332 and 333 authorize the president to unilaterally deploy
state and federal troops to suppress any “rebellion” or “insurrec-
tion” that impedes the execution of federal law or obstructs the
execution of state law so as to deprive persons within a given state
of any constitutional right, respectively. The sole condition to uni-
lateral action, apart from the requisite presidential determination,
is the proclamation of dispersal set forth in Section 334.82
The current text of the Insurrection Act reflects the state of
the law after a number of limits on presidential discretion to do-
mestically call forth the militia (and, later, federal armed forces)
had been removed.83 Among the remaining statutory requirements
81 Or, in addition, any instance of domestic violence or unlawful obstruction, com-
bination, assemblage or rebellion.
82 10 U.S.C. § 334.
83 See generally Vladeck, supra note 12, at 159-67. The Militia Act of 1792—the origi-
nal predecessor of the Insurrection Act—authorized the president to call forth only
the militia (and not federal armed forces) in order to suppress an insurrection upon
“application of the legislator of such state” or the executive (i.e., governor) of a given
state if the legislature was not in session. Further, once the requisite state legislative
requests (or approvals) were made, the president was authorized to commandeer
both the militia of the given state as well as of any other states “as may be applied for.”
The president’s authorization to call forth the militia in order to “execute the
laws of the union,” meanwhile, was subject to additional conditions under the 1792
Act. In addition to the president’s initial order that any insurgents “disperse,” such
authorization was subject to notification by a Supreme Court justice or other federal
judge that the laws of the union were being opposed or their execution obstructed
“by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial
proceedings.” Upon receiving such notification, the president was authorized to call
forth the militia of states other than the target state only if militia of the target state
refused to execute federal law and Congress were not in session. Moreover, the presi-
dent’s authorization to commandeer militia of other states was time-bound: the presi-
dent could do so for up to thirty days after the commencement of the ensuing session
of Congress.
Intervening legislation—namely, the Militia Act of 1795 (1795 Act)—eliminated
the requirements for approvals from state and judicial branches, as well as the time
limitation imposed on the deployment of militia from other states when Congress was
out of session. Furthermore, the Insurrection Act as passed in 1807 broadened the
president’s powers by authorizing the unilateral deployment of both state militia and
federal armed forces.
The Suppression of the Rebellion Act of 1861 represents the final major revision
to the legislative regime authorizing the president to domestically deploy the militia
and federal armed forces in order to suppress insurrection. Incorporated into the text
of the current-day Insurrection Act, the 1861 version expanded both the time period
during which the president was authorized to call forth the militia and federal armed
forces, and the discretion of the president in determining those instances that war-
ranted federal military intervention.
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for federal military intervention under the Insurrection Act is a
proclamation of insurrection—specifically, pursuant to Section
334, the president must “immediately order the insurgents to dis-
perse and retire peaceably to their abodes within a limited time.”84
Once made, such a proclamation defines an internal disturbance
as an “insurrection” warranting federal military intervention.
Courts have determined that – in the absence of the requisite pres-
idential proclamation—the deployment of federal troops with law
enforcement powers was a violation of Posse Comitatus.
A review of archival presidential proclamations for this article
reveals that past presidents have invoked the Insurrection Act or its
preceding legislation at least 24 times.85 While presidential procla-
mations based on a grant of constitutional or statutory authority
have the force of law, they are directed outside the government at
civilians; accordingly, proclamations of insurrection are supple-
mented by executive orders, which are directives aimed at parties
inside the government in order to facilitate the requisite federal
military action to be taken to restore law and order.86
a. 2007 National Defense Authorization Act
In the wake of the Hurricane Katrina crisis, the Insurrection
Act was amended to broaden the category of scenarios that would
authorize the president to deploy federal troops with law enforce-
ment powers87—a move that was later countered by the National
84 10 U.S.C. § 254 (2016) (formerly codified at 10 U.S.C. § 334).
85 A presidential proclamation is “ ‘an instrument that states a condition, declares
a law and requires obedience, recognizes an event or triggers the implementation of a
law (by recognizing that the circumstances in law have been realized)’. In short, presi-
dents ‘define’ situations or conditions on situations that become legal or economic
truth. These orders carry the same force of law as executive orders—the difference
between the two is that executive orders are aimed at those inside government while
proclamations are aimed at those outside government. The administrative weight of
these proclamations is upheld because they are often specifically authorized by con-
gressional statute, making them ‘delegated unilateral powers.’ Presidential proclama-
tions are often dismissed as a practical presidential tool for policy making because of
the perception of proclamations as largely ceremonial or symbolic in nature. How-
ever, the legal weight of presidential proclamations suggests their importance to presi-
dential governance.” Presidential Proclamation Database, PERFECT SUBSTITUTE (Nov. 4,
2009), http://perfectsubstitute.blogspot.com/2009/11/presidential-proclomation-
database.html [https://perma.cc/2WNT-XK4N] (citation omitted). See also Presiden-
tial Proclamations: Washington - Trump, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presi-
dency.ucsb.edu/proclamations.php [https://perma.cc/X4DQ-267Q].
86 JOHN CONTRUBIS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 95-772 A, EXECUTIVE ORDERS AND
PROCLAMATIONS (1999).
87 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-364,
sec. 1076, § 333, 120 Stat. 2083, 2404-05 (2006).
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Association of Governors, who mobilized to revoke all such amend-
ments and, thus, once again limit the presidential discretion to de-
ploy federal troops with law enforcement powers.88
The Insurrection Act amendments were buried in the 2007
National Defense Authorization Act, passed on October 17, 2006.
Specifically, Section 333—the title of which was renamed “Major
public emergencies; interference with State and Federal law”—was
amended to authorize the president to militarily intervene to “re-
store public order and enforce the laws of the United States when,
as a result of a natural disaster, epidemic, or other serious public
health emergency, terrorist attack or incident, or other condition
. . . .”89 Such intervention, under the revised text, was authorized
upon the president’s determination that “domestic violence ha[d]
occurred to such an extent that the constituted authorities of the
State or possession are incapable of maintaining public order,” and
such violence results in the obstruction of federal law or the inabil-
ity of the state or possession to protect the constitutional rights of
persons present therein.90
After a nearly year-long challenge led by the National Gover-
nors Association, amendments to the Insurrection Act were re-
pealed in their entirety in a scarcely noticed section of the defense
appropriations bill for the 2008 fiscal year.91 However, upon sign-
ing the 2008 defense appropriations bill into law, President Bush
issued a signing statement stating that its provisions would be con-
strued in a manner consistent with the constitutional authority of
the President.92
88 NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N, AMERICA WINS: THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF THE
NATIONAL GUARD (2012), https://www.nga.org/files/live/sites/NGA/files/pdf/1210
NationalGuardAmericaWins.pdf [https://perma.cc/B6RM-WNPD].
89 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, sec. 1076, § 333
(a)(A).
90 Id.
91 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181,
sec. 1068, § 333, 122 Stat. 3, 325-26 (2008).
92 “Provisions of the Act, including sections 841, 846, 1079, and 1222, purport to
impose requirements that could inhibit the President’s ability to carry out his consti-
tutional obligations to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, to protect na-
tional security, to supervise the executive branch, and to execute his authority as
Commander in Chief. The executive branch shall construe such provisions in a man-
ner consistent with the constitutional authority of the President.” Statement on Sign-
ing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, 44 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. DOC. 115 (Jan. 28, 2008).
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b. Reconstruction Act and the Enforcement Acts
It is well known that the Reconstruction Act of 186793 and the
Enforcement Acts passed in 1870 and 187194 authorized executive
deployment of federal troops to enforce the law in specific re-
sponse to violations of civil rights during Reconstruction and, later,
carried out by vigilante groups such as the Ku Klux Klan. What has
been generally little discussed is the relationship between this legis-
lation and the antecedent Insurrection Act. Provisions of the Re-
construction Act and the Enforcement Acts track the language in
the Insurrection Act, partially delegating the calling forth power of
Congress to the president in order to suppress “insurrection” or
“rebellion.” Unlike the Insurrection Act, these statutes specified in-
stances of “insurrection” warranting federal military intervention,
respectively, to be disturbances of the fledgling peace in former
Confederate states after the Civil War, and, thereafter, the vigilante
violence carried out in former rebel states by the Ku Klux Klan. In
other words, their legislation authorized federal military interven-
tion to enforce the fundamental rights of persons who were being
persecuted by the state and/or an insurgent third party.
The Reconstruction Act essentially subjected the former Con-
federate states (with the exception of Tennessee) to federal mili-
tary administration. The act provided for the division of eleven
former Confederate states into five military districts,95 with each
one to be administered by an officer of the army. Each such officer
was to be detailed military force to “enable [him] to perform his
duties and enforce his authority within the district to which he
[was] assigned.”96 Among such officer’s assigned duties was to “pro-
tect all persons in their rights of person and property, to suppress
insurrection, disorder, and violence, and to punish, or cause to be
punished, all disturbers of the public peace and criminals[.]”97 The
Reconstruction Act was subsequently amended to expressly add as
duties of such military officers the registration of voters and the
supervision of elections.98
93 First Reconstruction Act of 1867, ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428.
94 Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140; Enforcement Act of 1871, ch. 22,
17 Stat. 13.
95 “[R]ebel States shall be divided into military districts and made subject to the
military authority of the United States as hereinafter prescribed, and for that purpose
Virginia shall constitute the first district; North Carolina and South Carolina the sec-
ond district; Georgia, Alabama, and Florida the third district; Mississippi and Arkansas
the fourth district; and Louisiana and Texas the fifth district.” § 1, 14 Stat. at 428.
96 Id. § 2.
97 Id. § 3.
98 Second Reconstruction Act of 1867, ch. 6, 15 Stat. 2.
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The premise for federal military intervention, as set forth in
the preamble to the statute, was that no “legal . . . governments or
adequate protection for life or property” existed in such former
rebel states.99 In other words, the former rebel states were analo-
gous to “failed states.” Accordingly, people of such failed states
were denied representation in Congress until new constitutions
were drafted and ratified in each such state that provided for the
suffrage of all men aged twenty-one and over and adopted the
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Until such time,
federal military forces would administer the rebel states and any
civilian governments functioning in the interim period would be
deemed provisional.100
The Enforcement Acts—of May 31, 1870, February 28, 1871,
and April 20, 1871—(“Force Acts”) were enacted to enforce,
among other things, Black suffrage, and authorized the use of fed-
eral military force to protect the right of newly enfranchised Black
citizens to vote. The 1870 Act imposed fines and criminal penal-
ties101 upon persons who did, or conspired to, “by force, bribery,
threats, intimidation, or other unlawful means, . . . hinder, delay,
prevent or obstruct, . . . any citizen . . . from voting at any election
. . . .”102 Further, in a clause aimed at the Ku Klux Klan, the 1870
Act provided for the felony conviction of “two or more persons
[who] shall band or conspire together, or in disguise upon the
public highway, or upon the premises of another, with intent to
violate any provision of [the] act, or to injure, oppress, threaten, or
intimidate any citizen” with intent to deprive such citizen of his or
her constitutional rights.103 Any warrants issued pursuant to the
Force Acts were to be executed by federal marshals, who were au-
thorized to call forth the militia—as well as federal armed forces
and even civilian bystanders—in order to do such. The subsequent
acts expanded the authorized scope of federal intervention, chiefly
99 § 1, 14 Stat. at 428.
100 ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877
276-77 (1988) (“The Reconstruction Act of 1867 divided the eleven Confederate
states, except Tennessee, into five military districts under commanders empowered to
employ the army to protect life and property. And without immediately replacing the
Johnson regimes, it laid out the steps by which new state governments could be cre-
ated and recognized by Congress—essentially the writing of new constitutions provid-
ing for manhood suffrage, their approval by a majority of registered voters, and
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. . . . The act contained no mechanism for
beginning the process of change, an oversight soon remedied by a supplemental mea-
sure authorizing military commanders to register voters and hold elections.”).
101 Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140.
102 Id. § 4.
103 Id. § 6.
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by providing for federal supervision of elections in February 1871,
and, in April 1871, making it lawful for the president to suspend
the writ of habeas corpus during a “rebellion.”104
3. Stafford Act
Whereas the Insurrection Act is the domestic authority for hu-
manitarian intervention at home, the Stafford Act provides for the
domestic provision of humanitarian aid.105 Again, the Stafford Act is
worth discussing here in light of its contrast to the combative federal
law enforcement effectively authorized by the Insurrection Act—
and, in other words, for the non-combative intention evident in the
text of the Stafford Act and the potential fallout of a federal re-
sponse to internal crisis under the statute versus the Insurrection
Act. Moreover, as the Stafford Act provides for federal intervention
that does not usurp the police powers of the several states, such
intervention—analogous to humanitarian aid abroad—has been
relatively less controversial than intervention authorized under the
Insurrection Act.
104 KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE ERA OF RECONSTRUCTION 1865-1877 200-01 (1965)
(“Two so-called Force Acts, passed on May 31, 1870, and February 28, 1871, provided
that the use of force or intimidation to prevent citizens from voting was to be pun-
ished by fine or imprisonment, authorized the President to use the military when
necessary to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment, and placed congressional elections
under federal supervision. A third Force Act, the Ku Klux Act of April 20, 1871, im-
posed heavier penalties on persons who ‘shall conspire together, or go in disguise . . .
for the purpose . . . of depriving any person or any class of persons of the equal
protection of the laws, or of equal privileges or immunities under the laws.’ Addi-
tional federal troops were sent into the South, and President Grant suspended the
writ of habeas corpus in a number of South Carolina counties. After scores of arrests,
fines, and imprisonments, the Klan’s power was finally broken, and by 1872 it had
almost disappeared.”).
105 Notably, the purpose set forth in the Stafford Act tracks that set forth in the
policies and procedures of the U.S. Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA)—a
unit of USAID responsible for facilitating and coordinating foreign disaster response
missions under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. Further, OFDA implements its
mission to “save lives, alleviate human suffering” and “reduce the economic and social
impacts of present and future disasters” with policies derived from the U.N. Guiding
Principles for Internal Displacement—a list of humanitarian principles to which the
United Nations has advised governments to adhere when responding to internally
displaced persons. Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, supra note 8; see also Office
of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance, USAID, https://www.usaid.gov/who-we-are/organiza-
tion/bureaus/bureau-democracy-conflict-and-humanitarian-assistance/office-us
[https://perma.cc/XZ2C-FZJQ] (last updated Nov. 15, 2016) (“OFDA fulfills its man-
date of saving lives, alleviating human suffering, and reducing the social and eco-
nomic impact of disasters worldwide in partnership with USAID functional and
regional bureaus and other U.S. Government agencies.”). However, unlike under the
Stafford Act, U.S. disaster assistance can only be provided if, among other things, the
affected country either requests such assistance or is “willing to accept” such assis-
tance, thus formally enshrining the sanctity of the sovereignty of the affected state.
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The Stafford Act is the foremost—though not sole—statutory
authority governing federal intervention, military or otherwise, in a
natural or man-made disaster.106 Enacted in 1988, the Act is among
the most recent in a series of legislation passed since 1950 estab-
lishing a statutory framework for the federal government to assist
states and localities in the event of a disaster scenario.107 The Staf-
ford Act provides for the federal government to assist states and
localities with both disaster response—i.e., the provision of emer-
gency services to aid search-and-rescue and other response ef-
forts—and disaster recovery—whereby monetary aid and other
resources are administered to support the reconstruction and reha-
bilitation of the affected state or locality. The Stafford Act also, im-
portantly, establishes the primary statutory framework for the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (“FEMA”) to coordinate
and implement disaster response and recovery efforts in collabora-
tion with other federal agencies, as well as state and localities, in
the wake of small- and large-scale disasters.
The text of the Stafford Act, emphasized below, characterizes
missions carried out thereunder with humanitarian language. The
congressional findings and declarations set forth in Title I of the
Act as last amended in 2013, for instance, acknowledge that disas-
ters “often cause loss of life, human suffering, loss of income, and
property loss and damage; and because disasters often disrupt the
normal functioning of governments and communities, and ad-
versely affect individuals and families with great severity; special
measures . . . are necessary.”108 Moreover, a number of provisions
106 Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, Pub. L. No.
100-707, 102 Stat. 4689 (1988) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5191); see also
Michael Bahar, The Presidential Intervention Principle: The Domestic Use of the Military and
the Power of the Several States, 5 HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. 537, 626-27 (2014) (“There is
no greater example of this than the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency
Act (“Stafford Act”). It is a powerful tool the President can use in a domestic emer-
gency to authorize federal assistance, including military assistance, short of enforce-
ment and intervention.” (footnote omitted)).
107 In 1950, Congress passed the Federal Disaster Relief Act, which standardized
the process of requesting federal assistance for emergency management, replacing an
older system of providing funding on an “incident-by-incident” basis. Congress then
passed the Disaster Relief Act of 1974, which created a program to directly assist indi-
viduals and households in the event of disaster. The Stafford Act built on that founda-
tion when passed as an amendment to the Disaster Relief Act in 1988. FEMA, U.S.
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., THE FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY PUBLICA-
TION 1, 24, 35 (2010), https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1823-2504
5-8164/pub_1_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/RC5T-PQJ3].
108 Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 93-
288, § 1, 88 Stat. 143, 143 (1974) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5121 (2013)).
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therein refer to the intention to save lives and alleviate or prevent
human suffering.
Pursuant to the Stafford Act, the federal government is au-
thorized to supplement state and local efforts to respond to, and
provide monetary and other relief as to, any “emergency” or “ma-
jor disaster,” as defined thereunder.
Under the act, an “emergency” means:
any occasion or instance for which, in the determination of the
President, Federal assistance is needed to supplement State and
local efforts and capabilities to save lives and to protect property and
public health and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a catas-
trophe in any part of the United States.109
An “emergency,” as defined, tends to be a fairly small incident
that warrants limited federal intervention and pursuant to which
total monetary federal assistance is capped at $5 million per emer-
gency unless the president determines that additional funds are
necessary.110
A “major disaster” is defined in the Stafford Act as follows:
any natural catastrophe (including any hurricane, tornado,
storm, high water, winddriven water, tidal wave, tsunami, earth-
quake, volcanic eruption, landslide, mudslide, snowstorm, or
drought), or, regardless of cause, any fire, flood, or explosion,
. . . which in the determination of the President causes damage
of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant major disaster
assistance under this Act to supplement the efforts and available
resources of the States, local governments, and disaster relief or-
ganizations in alleviating the damage, loss, hardship, or suffering
caused thereby.111
As compared to an emergency, a “major disaster” is a large-scale
catastrophe that is expected to warrant extensive resources of the
federal government, which shares with affected states or localities
not less than 75 percent of the costs of the provided assistance.112
109 42 U.S.C. § 5122(1) (emphasis added).
110 Michael Widomski, Bringing in Federal Disaster Help: The Disaster Declaration Pro-
cess, FEMA: BLOG (June 16, 2012, 3:02 PM), https://www.fema.gov/blog/2012-03-07/
bringing-federal-disaster-help-disaster-declaration-process [https://perma.cc/VR9X-
W7G4] (“The total amount of assistance provided for a single emergency may not
exceed $5 million.”).
111 Id. § 5122(2) (emphasis added).
112 Public Assistance: Frequently Asked Questions, FEMA, https://www.fema.gov/public-
assistance-frequently-asked-questions#Q01 [https://perma.cc/2GCQ-RAR6] (last up-
dated Mar. 7, 2016, 10:13 AM) (“FEMA provides supplemental assistance for State
and local government recovery expenses, and the Federal share will always be at least
75 percent of the eligible costs.”).
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Although the Stafford Act does not authorize the president to
domestically deploy troops with law enforcement powers, it is
worth noting that, similar to the use of military force under the
Insurrection Act, domestic humanitarian aid can be extended
under the Stafford Act either unilaterally or by local invitation.
Federal assistance is triggered under the Stafford Act either unilat-
erally, by the president, or pursuant to a presidential declaration of
an “emergency” or “major disaster” made at the request of the gov-
ernor of the affected state.113 As for the latter trigger, the governor
of the affected state may request that the president make a declara-
tion of “emergency” or “major disaster” based, in each instance,
“on a finding that the situation is of such severity and magnitude
that effective response is beyond the capabilities of the State and
the affected local governments and that Federal assistance is neces-
sary.”114 Furthermore, the governor must furnish such a request
with information describing efforts and resources that have already
been and are expected to be used at the state and local level to
respond to the disaster. As for the former trigger of federal assis-
tance, the president may make a unilateral determination that an
“emergency” exists, for which the federal government must assume
primary responsibility because the incident involves a subject area
for which the federal government exercises exclusive or preemi-
nent authority. Though the president is authorized to unilaterally
make such a determination, the president must, if practicable, con-
sult with the governor of the affected state in the course of doing
so.
B. Just Cause
A “just cause,” as considered in the context of international
humanitarian intervention, is a circumstance deemed to justify mil-
itary intervention in order to protect human life and dignity.115
This definition is knowingly tautological because such a determina-
tion is more philosophical and moral than it is legal in nature, and,
thereby, eschews concrete criteria. Indeed, questions of legal au-
thority discussed above arise after a crisis has erupted that elicits
from one or more states a responsibility to protect human life that
transcends the respect for sovereignty. To the extent that criteria
113 Id. § 5170.
114 Id. § 5170(a).
115 INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO
PROTECT XII (2001) [hereinafter RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT], http://responsibili-
tytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/X59M-6XQA].
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for a just cause were legally definable, it would be akin to a stan-
dard rather than a rule—for instance, an attack on human life and
dignity so grave as to “shock the conscience.”116
However, because different consciences bear different thresh-
olds for shock, additional attention has been paid to the process by
which a just cause is determined, with some scholars conferring
more legitimacy to multilateral (and, perhaps, coalition-based) de-
liberations than unilateral ones.117 Specifically, just causes identi-
fied by a “jury”—most preferably by the U.N. Security Council or
General Assembly and, perhaps, by a regional body—are afforded
more formal credibility and moral weight than those made by one
state or even a given state and a coalition of its allies.118 Further,
official decision-makers have tended to confer legitimacy to those
interventions made pursuant to “local invitation”—that is, a re-
quest for or consent to intervention by a state government or inter-
nationally recognized non-state actors.119
While efforts have been made by moral philosophers and legal
scholars to specify standards for what constitutes a just cause as well
as processes for determining them, commentators on foreign pol-
icy have generally identified just causes empirically—that is, by refer-
ence to what one or more states have, in practice, deemed them to
116 Id. at 75 (“If we believe that all human beings are equally entitled to be pro-
tected from acts that shock the conscience of us all, then we must match rhetoric with
reality, principle with practice.”); id. at 32 (“In the Commission’s view, military inter-
vention for human protection purposes is justified in two broad sets of circumstances,
namely in order to halt or avert:
– large scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not,
which is the product of either of deliberate state of action, or state neglect or
inability to act, or a failed state situation; or
– large scale ‘ethnic cleansing,’ actual or apprehended, whether carried out by
killing, forced expulsion, actions of terror or rape.
If either or both of these conditions are satisfied, it is our view that the ‘just cause’
component of the decision to intervene is amply satisfied.”).
117 See, e.g., Stefano Recchia, Authorising Humanitarian Intervention: A Five-Point De-
fence of Existing Multilateral Procedures, 43 REV. INT’L STUD. 50 (2017).
118 Id. at 65, 65 n.80 (citing G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶ 139, 2005 World Summit Outcome
(Sept. 16, 2005)).
119 See, e.g., Michael S. Lund, Preventive Diplomacy for Macedonia, 1992-1999: From
Containment to Nation Building, in OPPORTUNITIES MISSED, OPPORTUNITIES SEIZED: PRE-
VENTIVE DIPLOMACY IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD 173, 206 (Bruce W. Jentleson ed.,
2000) (“[A] local invitation was the immediate prompting. This helped greatly over-
come barriers to third-party entry that would otherwise be posed by sovereign prerog-
atives of unwilling protagonists or a dangerous situation.”); James D. Boys, A Lost
Opportunity: The Flawed Implementation of Assertive Multilateralism (1991-1993), EUR. J.
AM. STUD., Spring 2012, at 1, 7 (describing negative effects from intervening without
receiving a local invitation).
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be.120 Accordingly, in realist foreign policy terms, a “just cause” is
one for which the political will has been mobilized to support inter-
vention, or, in the absence of timely intervention, a circumstance
that has been deemed to warrant intervention by an ex post facto
moral consensus. For instance, prior to the terrorist attacks of Sep-
tember 11,121 classic examples of crises deemed, whether retrospec-
tively or at the time, to have warranted humanitarian intervention
are the genocidal or other grave events that occurred in Bosnia,
Kosovo, Rwanda, and Somalia.122
With the above international atrocities in mind, some might
consider it hyperbolic to map the dilemmas of humanitarian inter-
vention onto apparently less dire situations at home. Furthermore,
while it is unequivocal that the United States government has a
responsibility to protect its citizens, which would be presumably un-
controversial to fulfill, the responsibility to do the same for non-
citizens abroad is, by comparison, not only of dubious certainty,
but its assumption is often politically unpopular.123 However, as dis-
cussed in more detail below, it is fitting to consider humanitarian
intervention at home in light of crises deemed to constitute just
causes abroad.
As for the relative gravity of crises at home and abroad, what is
key in mapping international “just cause” considerations onto do-
mestic ones is not simply the degree of violence or rights violations
on the ground, but the nature of circumstances deemed to warrant
intervention. Analogous to the international context, circum-
stances at home deemed “just causes” are those in which a state was
unwilling or unable to protect the rights of persons harmed
therein. Specifically, an overview of the application of the Insurrec-
120 See, e.g., James Joyner, How Perpetual War Became U.S. Ideology, ATLANTIC (May 11,
2011), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/05/how-perpetual-
war-became-us-ideology/238600 [https://perma.cc/27RA-Q56H] (describing the le-
gitimacy of interventions through the lens of past interventions); CHRISTOPHER C.
BURKETT, THE HERITAGE FOUND., REMAKING THE WORLD: PROGRESSIVISM AND AMERICAN
FOREIGN POLICY (2013), http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2013/pdf/fp47.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7NHG-TQEV].
121 Recent conflicts, revolutions, and rebellions in Egypt, Libya, Syria, Bahrain, and
the Arab Spring are beyond the scope of this article.
122 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
123 Andrew Kohut, American International Engagement on the Rocks, PEW RES. CTR.
(July 11, 2013), http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/07/11/american-international-en-
gagement-on-the-rocks [https://perma.cc/C9VR-9E5T]; Lesley Wroughton, As Syria
War Escalates, Americans Cool to U.S. Intervention, REUTERS (Aug. 24, 2013, 8:32 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-crisis-usa-poll-idUSBRE97O00E20130825
[https://perma.cc/9DDU-3PRT].
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tion Act shows that humanitarian intervention has been largely124
deemed warranted to, on the one hand, enforce the civil rights of
Black (and other non-white) citizens over the objection of state of-
ficials, and, on the other, to suppress “race riots.” In other words,
“just cause” considerations are apt, regardless of the relative degree
of domestic disturbances, because implicit in such considerations,
whether at home or abroad, are deliberations over a government’s
unjust deprivation of rights or a “failed state” scenario brought
about by “civil war” or “insurgency.”
Further, as elaborated in the above discussion of The Federalist
Papers and the legislative context of Posse Comitatus, federal mili-
tary intervention at home is not politically uncontroversial. Such
intervention has not only been contentious in light of a constitu-
tional balance of federal and state powers, but also poses particular
political concern when considered in Southern states (as indicated
in President Bush’s quote).125 Humanitarian intervention at home
tends to be more politically fraught when contemplated unilater-
ally, solely by the presidential administration, rather than mutually,
with the consent or at the request of state officials—in other words,
without “local invitation.” Finally, domestic “just causes” are simi-
larly disposed to tautological definitions: the legal authorization
for the president to engage in humanitarian intervention at home,
ultimately, relies largely on a subjective judgment call—that is,
whether a circumstance is deemed to be an “insurrection” or not.
Such instances that reveal the trend outlined above are procla-
mations of insurrection to enforce civil rights during the post-war
Reconstruction Era, to desegregate public schools in Alabama, Ar-
kansas, and Mississippi, and to enforce the rights of protestors to
march from Selma to Montgomery. Further, insurrection was pro-
claimed to suppress the following “race riots”: (1) the violent
clashes in “Bleeding Kansas” prior to the Civil War; (2) anti-Chi-
nese expulsion campaigns in the Northwest; (3) the Detroit race
riots of 1943 and 1967; (4) riots in Baltimore and Washington,
D.C. following the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr.; (5)
looting in St. Croix in the aftermath of Hurricane Hugo, and (6)
riots in Los Angeles in the wake of the Rodney King verdict.126
124 But see, e.g., Marjorie Jean Bonney, Federal Intervention in Labor Disputes, 7 MINN.
L. REV. 467, 472 (1923) (“President Cleveland sent the federal troops to the [Pull-
man] strike scene, not to quell domestic violence, as did President Hayes, but to pro-
tect the United States mails and interstate commerce and to enforce the orders of the
federal courts.”).
125 See notes 1, 3, 87-92 and accompanying text supra.
126 See infra section I.B.1. (on enforcing civil rights) and I.B.2. (on suppressing
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Many of these incidents are well-known and have been dis-
cussed in far more detail elsewhere. Accordingly, they are cursorily
reconsidered here only in light of their designation as “just causes”
warranting the exceptional deployment of federal troops with law
enforcement powers. The overview in this subsection will elaborate
on the trend noted above (and illustrated in the table below) –
namely, that a significant number of proclamations of “insurrec-
tion” were made to authorize federal military intervention to en-
force civil rights violated by state actors or suppress “race riots”
incited by non-state actors, with intervention in the former cate-
gory of incidents typically authorized unilaterally and the latter by
gubernatorial request or, in other words, by local invitation.
Moreover, as indicated from public speeches made by the
president or state officials at the time, those interventions deemed
relatively less politically fraught were made at the request of the
state governor or other state official(s), and, further, the relevant
incident or insurrection in question tended to be a “race riot.”127
On the other hand, those interventions that were at the time
deemed more politically fraught were those made unilaterally in
the sole discretion of the executive, and, further, the nature of the
incident in question generally involved the enforcement of civil
“race riots”). The federal government also intervened during the Gilded Age to pro-
tect market forces, capital, and property, instead of protecting civil rights. FONER,
supra note 100, at 582-83 (“Among other things, 1877 marked a decisive retreat from
the idea, born during the Civil War, of a powerful national state protecting the funda-
mental rights of American citizens. Yet the federal government was not rendered im-
potent in all matters—only those concerning blacks. Hayes did not hesitate to employ
the national state’s coercive powers for other purposes. Even as the last Reconstruc-
tion governments toppled, troops commanded by former Freedmen’s Bureau Com-
missioner O. O. Howard relentlessly pursued the Nez Percé Indians across the Far
West to enforce a federal order removing them from Oregon’s Wallowa Valley.”). Id.
at 583 (“Nor did the federal government prove reluctant to intervene with force to
protect the rights of property.”). Id. at 584 (“As requests for troops descended upon
the Administration from frightened governors and beleaguered railroad executives,
Hayes neither investigated the need for troops nor set clear guidelines for their use.
Thus, when soldiers were sent to cities from Buffalo to St. Louis, they acted less as
impartial defenders of order than as strikebreakers, opening railroad lines, protecting
nonstriking workers, and preventing union meetings.”
127 See, e.g., Jake Lefferman, A Look Back at Presidential Responses to Racial Violence,
ABC NEWS (Aug. 15, 2014, 1:37 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2014/
08/a-look-back-at-presidential-responses-to-racial-violence [https://perma.cc/Q4DQ-
7NYG]; President George Bush, Address to the Nation on the Civil Disturbances in
Los Angeles, California (May 1, 1992), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=209
10 [https://perma.cc/5MBW-HGMK]; President Lyndon Johnson, Statement on the
Harlem Race Riots (July 21, 1964), http://www.nytimes.com/1964/07/22/statement-
by-president.html [https://perma.cc/TJ3L-M9K2].
424 CUNY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:389
rights.128
TABLE 1.3 INSURRECTION AS CIVIL RIGHTS VIOLATION & RACE RIOT
Civil Rights or
Incident(s) ‘Race Riot’ Unilateral Local Invitation
Bleeding Kansas ‘Race Riot’ X
Radical Civil Rights X
Reconstruction
Anti-Chinese ‘Race Riot’ X
Expulsion
Detroit Riots of ‘Race Riot’ X
1943 and 1967
Public School Civil Rights X
Desegregation
March from Civil Rights X
Selma to
Montgomery




Hurricane Hugo ‘Race Riot’ Territorial Presidential
Governor Administration






Atlanta Prison ‘Race Riot’ X
Riots129
Los Angeles ‘Race Riot’ X
Riots
128 Note that the distinction between suppressing a race riot and enforcement of
civil rights can be blurry, as the enforcement of civil rights does incite rioting, as with
James Meredith’s attempted entry into Ole Miss. However, the relevant distinction
here is whether civil rights enforcement was the primary intention of the interven-
tion, as opposed to the restoration of law and order made necessary by riotous civil
unrest.
129 See, e.g., Robert Pear, Military Hostage Specialists Sent to Help F.B.I. at Atlanta Prison,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 26, 1987), http://www.nytimes.com/1987/11/26/us/military-hos
tage-specialists-sent-to-help-fbi-at-atlanta-prison.html [https://perma.cc/FF3A-
A4KM].
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1. Enforcing Civil Rights
As discussed in this article, an overview of past proclamations
of insurrection reveals that at least thirteen incidents involved the
federal military enforcement of civil rights—namely, the deploy-
ment of federal troops to enforce constitutional rights of Black citi-
zens in the South during Radical Reconstruction, to desegregate
public schools in Alabama, Arkansas, and Mississippi, and to en-
force the right of protesters to march from Selma to Montgomery.
Of the twelve proclamations of insurrection, eleven were made uni-
laterally, and only one—regarding the march from Selma to Mont-
gomery—was made by request of the state governor (albeit, as will
be discussed further, as the result of political maneuvering by both
the president and the state governor).130
130 Andrew Johnson, Proclamation No. 166, Warning Against Obstruction of Justice
in the States of North and South Carolina (Sept. 3, 1867), in AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT
(Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley eds., 2017), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/
?pid=72124 [https://perma.cc/995X-4TN8]; Ulysses S. Grant, Proclamation No. 197,
Law and Order in the State of South Carolina (Mar. 24, 1871), in AM. PRESIDENCY
PROJECT (Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley eds., 2017), http://www.presidency.ucsb
.edu/ws/index.php?pid=70253 [https://perma.cc/UT5D-XUAS]; Ulysses S. Grant,
Proclamation No. 200, Law and Order in the State of South Carolina (Oct. 12, 1871),
in AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley eds., 2017), http://
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=70257 [https://perma.cc/UL58-87K7];
Ulysses S. Grant, Proclamation No. 213, Law and Order in the State of Louisiana (May
22, 1873), in AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley eds., 2017),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=70364 [https://perma.cc/
ZZU5-L5C3]; Ulysses S. Grant, Proclamation No. 218, Law and Order in the State of
Arkansas (May 15, 1874), in AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Gerhard Peters & John T. Wool-
ley eds., 2017), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=70420 [https://
perma.cc/SF5U-KXAB]; Ulysses S. Grant, Proclamation No. 220, Law and Order in
the State of Louisiana (Sept. 15, 1874), in AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Gerhard Peters &
John T. Woolley eds., 2017), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=
70422 [https://perma.cc/WLZ2-4458]; Ulysses S. Grant, Proclamation No. 223, Law
and Order in the State of Mississippi (Dec. 21, 1874), in AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT
(Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley eds., 2017), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/
?pid=70459 [https://perma.cc/7EDB-UDFP]; Ulysses S. Grant, Proclamation No. 232,
Law and Order in the State of South Carolina (Oct. 17, 1876), in AM. PRESIDENCY
PROJECT (Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley eds., 2017), http://www.presidency.ucsb
.edu/ws/?pid=70542 [https://perma.cc/3NC6-QXR8]; Dwight D. Eisenhower, Proc-
lamation No. 3204, Obstruction of Justice in the State of Arkansas (Sept. 23, 1957) in
AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley eds., 2017), http://www
.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=107178 [https://perma.cc/BB7U-MYWS]; John F.
Kennedy, Proclamation No. 3497, Obstructions of Justice in the State of Mississippi
(Sept. 30, 1962), in AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley eds.,
2017), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=24042 [https://perma.cc/SZ7C-
CXZ3]; John F. Kennedy, Proclamation No. 3542, Unlawful Obstructions of Justice
and Combinations in the State of Alabama (June 11, 1963), in AM. PRESIDENCY PRO-
JECT (Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley eds., 2017), http://www.presidency.ucsb
.edu/ws/?pid=9270 [https://perma.cc/93N2-DP96]; John F. Kennedy, Proclamation
No. 3554, Obstructions of Justice in the State of Alabama (Sept. 10, 1963), in AM.
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Eight of the twelve proclamations of insurrection were issued
during the roughly ten-year period after the Civil War131 known as
“Radical Reconstruction,” when the newfound constitutional rights
of freed Blacks were enforced, in part, through federal military in-
tervention (or, as sometimes termed, military “occupation” of the
South).132 As discussed above, the Reconstruction Act provided for
the division of “rebel States” into districts subject to federal military
authority, and, further, the army officer appointed to administer
each district was authorized thereunder to use military force to
suppress insurrection and otherwise enforce the law. However, de-
spite military officers’ authority under the Reconstruction Act to
call forth the militia and federal armed forces in former Confeder-
ate states, President Ulysses S. Grant made seven proclamations be-
tween 1871 and 1876133—each of which track the text of the
PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley eds., 2017), http://www.pres-
idency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=24115 [https://perma.cc/9YYZ-XTFN]; Lyndon
B. Johnson, Proclamation No. 3645, Providing Federal Assistance in the State of Ala-
bama (Mar. 20, 1965), in AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley
eds., 2017), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=106237 [https://perma.cc/
9US3-RT6M].
131 While historians date the start of the overarching Reconstruction Era to 1863—
when President Abraham Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation—the era of
“radical” Reconstruction was introduced in 1867 with the enactment of the Recon-
struction Act, discussed above, and ended in 1877 with the withdrawal of federal
troops from the South. FONER, supra note 100, at xvii.
132 Borne, in part, from Republican frustration with then President Andrew John-
son’s unwillingness to enforce the formal pronouncements of Black incorporation
into the body politic (as enumerated in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments), the Reconstruction Act authorized federal military “occupation” of former
Confederate states.
133 Ulysses S. Grant, Proclamation No. 197, Law and Order in the State of South
Carolina (Mar. 24, 1871), in AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Gerhard Peters & John T.
Woolley eds., 2017), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=70253
[https://perma.cc/UT5D-XUAS]; Ulysses S. Grant, Proclamation No. 200, Law and
Order in the State of South Carolina (Oct. 12, 1871), in AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT
(Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley eds., 2017), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/
index.php?pid=70257 [https://perma.cc/UL58-87K7]; Ulysses S. Grant, Proclama-
tion No. 213, Law and Order in the State of Louisiana (May 22, 1873), in AM. PRESI-
DENCY PROJECT (Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley eds., 2017), http://www
.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=70364 [https://perma.cc/ZZU5-L5C3];
Ulysses S. Grant, Proclamation No. 218, Law and Order in the State of Arkansas (May
15, 1874), in AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley eds., 2017),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=70420 [https://perma.cc/SF5U-
KXAB]; Ulysses S. Grant, Proclamation No. 220, Law and Order in the State of Louisi-
ana (Sept. 15, 1874), in AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley
eds., 2017), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=70422 [https://per
ma.cc/WLZ2-4458]; Ulysses S. Grant, Proclamation No. 223, Law and Order in the
State of Mississippi (Dec. 21, 1874), in AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Gerhard Peters &
John T. Woolley eds., 2017), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=70459
[https://perma.cc/7EDB-UDFP]; Ulysses S. Grant, Proclamation No. 232, Law and
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Insurrection Act and order “insurgents” to disperse, thus triggering
the authority of the president to deploy state and federal troops to
enforce law. Of the seven proclamations, four were issued with re-
spect to South Carolina, two regarding Louisiana, one as to Arkan-
sas, and another as to Mississippi.
Four proclamations of insurrection were issued to enforce the
desegregation of public schools in Arkansas, Mississippi, and Ala-
bama, respectively, in accordance with the Supreme Court’s
landmark decision in Brown v. Board of Education.134 All four procla-
mations track the text of the Insurrection Act,135 specifically citing
the president’s authority thereunder to unilaterally deploy federal
troops to enforce the law. On September 23, 1957—after failed
talks with Arkansas Governor Orval Faubus, who earlier that month
had ordered the state National Guard to blockade the Central
High School in Little Rock to prevent Black students from enter-
ing—President Dwight D. Eisenhower issued a presidential procla-
mation and, the next day, both deployed U.S. army troops and
federalized the entire Arkansas National Guard to protect Black
students as they walked into the school.136 President John F. Ken-
Order in the State of South Carolina (Oct. 17, 1876), in AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT
(Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley eds., 2017), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/
?pid=70542 [https://perma.cc/3NC6-QXR8].
134 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347, U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that racially segregated
public schools violate the Fourteenth Amendment); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S.
294 (1955) (requiring the Brown decision to be implemented “with all deliberate
speed”); see also Dwight D. Eisenhower, Proclamation No. 3204, Obstruction of Justice
in the State of Arkansas (Sept. 23, 1957) in AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Gerhard Peters
& John T. Woolley eds., 2017), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=107178
[https://perma.cc/BB7U-MYWS]; John F. Kennedy, Proclamation No. 3497, Obstruc-
tions of Justice in the State of Mississippi (Sept. 30, 1962), in AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT
(Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley eds., 2017), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/
?pid=24042 [https://perma.cc/SZ7C-CXZ3]; John F. Kennedy, Proclamation No.
3542, Unlawful Obstructions of Justice and Combinations in the State of Alabama
(June 11, 1963), in AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley eds.,
2017), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9270 [https://perma.cc/93N2-
DP96]; John F. Kennedy, Proclamation No. 3554, Obstructions of Justice in the State
of Alabama (Sept. 10, 1963), in AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Gerhard Peters & John T.
Woolley eds., 2017), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=24115
[https://perma.cc/9YYZ-XTFN].
135 Each order specifically referred to the “the authority vested in [the president]
by the Constitution and statutes of the United States, including Chapter 15 of Title 10
of the United States Code, particularly Sections 332, 333 and 334 thereof,” in order-
ing any person obstructing the law to cease and desist from such obstruction and
disperse. See supra note 134.
136 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Proclamation No. 3204, Obstruction of Justice in the
State of Arkansas (Sept. 23, 1957), in AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Gerhard Peters & John
T. Woolley eds., 2017), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=107178
[https://perma.cc/BB7U-MYWS]; Exec. Order. No. 10,730, 22 Fed. Reg. 7628 (Sept.
428 CUNY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:389
nedy issued three unilateral proclamations of insurrection: one in
1962 to enforce James Meredith’s right to attend the University of
Mississippi over the objection of Governor Ross Barnett, and two in
1963 to compel the entry of Black students into the University of
Alabama and the Tuskegee High School in Huntsville—overriding
the defiance of Alabama governor George Wallace, a staunch op-
ponent of desegregation.137
The proclamation issued to enforce the right of protestors to
march from Selma to Montgomery, however, was technically made
by gubernatorial request. On March 20, 1965, President Lyndon B.
Johnson issued a proclamation ordering the dispersal of persons
obstructing the federal-court ordered138 right of such protesters,
who had attempted to march two times prior—the first on March 7
in a televised confrontation known as “Bloody Sunday,” in which
state troopers and local police brutally attacked non-violent protes-
tors with nightsticks and tear gas.139 The proclamation referenced
the federal court order and stated that Governor Wallace had “ad-
vised [President Johnson] that the state is unable and refuses to
provide for the safety and welfare, among others, of the plaintiffs
and the members of the class they represent”140—an advisement
24, 1957); Anthony Lewis, President Sends Troops to Little Rock; Federalizes Arkansas Na-
tional Guard; Tells Nation He Acted to Avoid Anarchy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1957, at A1.
137 John F. Kennedy, Proclamation No. 3497, Obstructions of Justice in the State of
Mississippi (Sept. 30, 1962), in AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Gerhard Peters & John T.
Woolley eds., 2017), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=24042 [https://per
ma.cc/SZ7C-CXZ3]; John F. Kennedy, Proclamation No. 3542, Unlawful Obstructions
of Justice and Combinations in the State of Alabama (June 11, 1963), in AM. PRESI-
DENCY PROJECT (Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley eds., 2017), http://www.presi-
dency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9270 [https://perma.cc/93N2-DP96]; Exec. Order No.
11,111, 28 Fed. Reg. 5709 (June 12, 1963) (directing the Secretary of Defense to take
all appropriate steps to enforce the laws of the United States in Alabama, including
calling the National Guard into active service); John F. Kennedy, Proclamation No.
3554, Obstructions of Justice in the State of Alabama (Sept. 10, 1963), in AM. PRESI-
DENCY PROJECT (Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley eds., 2017), http://www.presi-
dency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=24115 [https://perma.cc/9YYZ-XTFN].
138 President Johnson made the proclamation following an order by Judge Frank
Minis Johnson of the federal district court of the Middle District of Alabama that
upheld the First Amendment rights of protestors to march and provided injunctive
relief prohibiting police harassment and requiring the state of Alabama to provide
police protection to protestors. See Williams v. Wallace, 240 F. Supp. 100 (M.D. Ala.
1965).
139 Lyndon B. Johnson, Proclamation No. 3645, Providing Federal Assistance in the
State of Alabama (Mar. 20, 1965), in AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Gerhard Peters & John
T. Woolley eds., 2017), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=106237 [https://
perma.cc/9US3-RT6M]; Jessie Kindig, Selma, Alabama, (Bloody Sunday, March 7, 1965),
BLACKPAST.ORG, http://www.blackpast.org/aah/bloody-sunday-selma-alabama-march-
7-1965 [https://perma.cc/TJZ2-X9QA].
140 Lyndon B. Johnson, Proclamation No. 3645, Providing Federal Assistance in the
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which, as will be discussed below, was part of an underlying tactic
by Wallace to publicly maintain the appearance of defiance in the
face of federal intervention. Subsequently, civil rights protestors—
including Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and Ralph Bunche—
marched from Selma to Montgomery under the protection of ap-
proximately 2,000 U.S. army troops and 1,900 federalized members
of the Alabama National Guard.141
None of the above proclamations was issued without contro-
versy—which, this paper suggests, was due to the involvement of
state actors in fomenting “insurrection” and (with the technical ex-
ception of the march from Selma to Montgomery) the unilateral
nature of the proclamations. Indeed, the last in the series of proc-
lamations issued to suppress insurrection during Radical Recon-
struction foretold the death knell of federal military administration
of the former Confederate states. In January 1875, President Grant
ordered142 the use of federal military force in New Orleans, Louisi-
ana when Democrats attempted to forcibly install party members in
five contested state assembly seats.143 After the five members were
escorted out of the assembly chambers by federal troops, “Louisi-
ana . . . came to represent the dangers posed by excessive federal
interference in local affairs. The spectacle of soldiers ‘marching
into the Hall . . . and expelling members at the point of the bayo-
net’ aroused more Northern opposition than any previous federal
action in the South.”144 In the aftermath of this incident, Republi-
can representatives in Congress became “extremely wary” of fur-
ther federal military intervention in the South.145 The following
State of Alabama (Mar. 20, 1965), in AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Gerhard Peters & John
T. Woolley eds., 2017), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=106237 [https://
perma.cc/9US3-RT6M].
141 Roy Reed, Freedom March Begins at Selma; Troops on Guard, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21,
1965, at A1.
142 General Philip Sheridan, a former military governor of the district incorporat-
ing both Louisiana and Texas, led the military action. FONER, supra note 100, at 307,
554.
143 Id. at 554 (“Having suppressed the New Orleans insurrection of September
1874, Grant, newly determined to ‘protect the colored voter in his rights,’ ordered
General Sheridan to use federal troops to sustain the Kellogg administration and put
down violence. On January 4, 1875, when Democrats attempted to seize control of the
state assembly by forcibly installing party members in five disputed seats, a detach-
ment of federal troops under the command of Col. Phillippe de Trobriand entered
the legislative chambers and escorted out the five claimants. The following day, Sheri-
dan wired Secretary of War Belknap, urging that military tribunals be established to
try White League leaders as ‘banditti.’”).
144 Id.
145 Id. at 555 (“The uproar over Louisiana convinced Grant of the political dangers
posed by a close identification with Reconstruction, and made Congressional Republi-
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year, concerns over such intervention were leveraged in resolving
the hotly contested presidential election in favor of Republican
candidate Rutherford B. Hayes. Among the terms of the Compro-
mise of 1877—an unwritten pact made between the political fac-
tions to settle the 1876 presidential election—was an agreement by
Southern Democrats to recognize Hayes as the victor of the elec-
tion over Democrat Samuel Tilden in return for, among other
things, removing all remaining federal troops from the former
Confederate states.146 The removal of federal troops from the
South, indeed, constituted the end of Radical Reconstruction, and,
as discussed above, was codified in the Posse Comitatus Act passed
the following year.
Of the four proclamations regarding public school desegrega-
tion, two emphasize the insubordination of the state governors,
thus implying that unilateral deployment of federal troops in these
instances was a last resort. All of the governors involved in these
incidents were publicly defiant in the face of court-ordered deseg-
regation.147 Indeed, in publicly voicing dissent against federal
court orders mandating public school desegregation, Governor
Faubus referred to Eisenhower’s unilaterally ordered intervention
at Little Rock as “the military occupation of Arkansas.”148 The gov-
ernors of Mississippi and Alabama, for their part, called upon the
constitutional principles of federalism and characterized federal
cans extremely wary of further military intervention in the South.”). Id. at 556 (“The
legislative infighting of January and February 1875 illustrated how divided Republi-
cans had become over Reconstruction. ‘Is it possible,’ asked one House member,
‘that you can find power in the Constitution to declare war, levy taxes . . . and pass
laws upon all conceivable subjects and find means to enforce them, but can find no
power to protect American citizens . . . in the enjoyment and exercise of their consti-
tutional rights?’ Yet Congressional Republicans had little stomach for further inter-
vention in Southern affairs. Even men like Connecticut’s Joseph R. Hawley, who
proclaimed (with some exaggeration), ‘I have been a radical abolitionist from my
earliest days,’ had resigned themselves to the conclusion that the South’s ‘social, and
educational, and moral reconstruction’ could ‘never come from any legislative halls.’
Others now echoed the Democratic refrain that blacks should abandon ‘the habit . . .
[of relying] upon external aid,’ and sang the praises of ‘local self-government.’” (al-
terations in original)).
146 See id. at 582 (“‘[H]ome rule’ quickly came to Louisiana and South Carolina.
Within two months of taking office, Hayes ordered federal troops surrounding the
South Carolina and Louisiana statehouses, where Chamberlain and Packard still
claimed the office of governor, to return to their barracks. (Hayes did not, as legend
has it, remove the last federal troops from the South, but his action implicitly meant
that the few remaining soldiers would no longer play a role in political affairs.)”).
147 See infra notes 148-53 and accompanying text.
148 Peter Applebome, Orval Faubus, Segregation’s Champion, Dies at 84, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 15, 1994), http://www.nytimes.com/1994/12/15/obituaries/orval-faubus-seg-
regation-s-champion-dies-at-84.html [https://perma.cc/XR24-WHCY].
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encroachment into state affairs as a form of foreign invasion. Prior
to President Kennedy’s formal proclamation, Governor Wallace of
Alabama149 issued a statement that President Kennedy had “or-
der[ed] the federal troops to invade Alabama . . . .”150 Further, in a
speech delivered about two weeks before President Kennedy would
deploy federal troops to Mississippi, Governor Barnett recited the
Tenth Amendment and referred to “an ambitious federal govern-
ment, employing naked and arbitrary power, [which] has decided
to deny us the right of self-determination in the conduct of the
affairs of our sovereign state.”151 Calling desegregationists agitators
and trouble makers “pouring across our borders,” the governor
stated that the “federal government teamed up with a motley array
of un-American pressure groups against us.”152 In the end, Gover-
nor Barnett assured his constituency that he would do all in his
power to prevent integration and instigated a form of “posse comi-
tatus,” in the traditional sense of the term, by “call[ing] on every
public official and every private citizen of [his] great state to join
[him].”153
As for enforcing the right of protestors to march from Selma
to Montgomery, Governor Wallace did technically request that
President Johnson deploy federal troops in order to safely escort
marching civil rights protestors—technically, because he refused the
president’s advisement to deploy National Guard troops to do the
same.154 The circumstances of the request, however, highlight the
149 Governor Wallace sent a telegram to President Kennedy erroneously interpret-
ing the Insurrection Act as precluding the executive from unilaterally deploying fed-
eral troops, and asserting that he had not requested any federal military intervention
to “quell domestic violence.” Telegram from George Wallace, Governor, Ala., to John
F. Kennedy, U.S. President (May 13, 1963), in ALA. DEP’T ARCHIVES & HIST., http://
digital.archives.alabama.gov/cdm/ref/collection/voices/id/2224 [https://perma
.cc/USL8-QNSP].
150 Governor George C. Wallace, Statement Made by Governor George C. Wallace
After President Kennedy Sent Federal Troops to Handle the Violent Situation in Bir-
mingham, Alabama (May 13, 1963), in ALA. DEP’T ARCHIVES & HIST., http://digital
.archives.alabama.gov/cdm/singleitem/collection/voices/id/2968/rec/20 [https://
perma.cc/MWY5-9NBR].
151 Governor Ross Barnett, Governor Barnett’s Declaration to the People of Missis-
sippi (Sept. 13, 1962), in Integrating Ole Miss: A Civil Rights Milestone, JOHN F. KENNEDY




154 See Lyndon B. Johnson, News Conference at the LBJ Ranch (Mar. 20, 1965), in
AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley eds., 2017), http://www
.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=26816&st=&st1= [https://perma.cc/23YV-
KQV7] (“Even more surprising was your telegram of yesterday stating that both you
and the Alabama Legislature, because of monetary consideration, believe that the
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controversial nature of federal military intervention in enforcing
civil rights because, as is clear from White House transcripts of con-
versations after Bloody Sunday and before the proclamation was
made, President Johnson had communicated a strong preference
for Governor Wallace to protect the marchers with the state’s Na-
tional Guard,155 a move that Wallace resisted in a deft political
move to appear defiant before his anti-desegregationist base. In es-
sence, then, Governor Wallace’s “request” was less a genuine cry
for help, so to speak, and more so an official re-characterization of
his unwillingness to act. A press statement made by President John-
son, accordingly, highlights both the executive reluctance to de-
clare an insurrection as to the incident and the effective
gubernatorial abdication of the state’s implied police powers:
It is not a welcome duty for the Federal Government to ever
assume a State Government’s own responsibility for assuring the
protection of citizens in the exercise of their constitutional
rights. It has been rare in our history for the Governor and the
legislature of a sovereign state to decline to exercise their re-
sponsibility and to request that duty be assumed by the Federal
Government. Governor Wallace and the legislature of the State
of Alabama have now done this.156
2. Suppressing ‘Race Riots’
In addition to the enforcement of civil rights, an overview of
past proclamations of insurrection reveals that a significant num-
ber were made in response to “race riots.” Similar to “insurrec-
tion,” the term “race riot” is contentious and tautological, subject
to varying interpretations and, thereby, self-defining.157 For one,
State is unable to protect American citizens and to maintain peace and order in a
responsible manner without Federal forces.”); Fendall W. Yerxa, Johnson Calls Up
Troops, Deplores Wallace’s Acts; Alabama March on Today, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1965, at 1.
155 Yerxa, supra note 154.
156 Lyndon B. Johnson, News Conference at the LBJ Ranch (Mar. 20, 1965), in AM.
PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley eds., 2017), http://www.pres-
idency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=26816&st=&st1= [https://perma.cc/23YV-
KQV7]; see also Laurence Stern, Sending the Troops to Selma, WASH. POST (Mar. 21,
1999), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/lifestyle/1999/03/21/sending-the-
troops-to-selma/6e5ae053-fd08-4147-899d-df18a5e0f5e5/?utm_term=.4f291a16cf15
[https://perma.cc/8K3A-HGJM]; Alice Anne Stephens, LBJ, Governor Wallace, and
Buford Ellington in Selma, Alabama: The President, the Wildcard, and the Link, MILLER CTR.,
http://archive.millercenter.org/educationalresources/lbj-governor-wallace-and-
buford-ellington-in-selma-alabama [https://perma.cc/H9VB-E9ZN].
157 For one, though, in the United States, the term is commonly used to refer to
civil disturbances incited by Black residents of urban areas, the majority of “race riots”
have historically been incited by white vigilante groups. Further, in reference to “race
riots” incited by Black residents in urban areas, attempts have been made to re-desig-
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the distinction between suppressing a “race riot” and enforcing
civil rights can be blurry, as past attempts to exercise and enforce
civil rights have incited riots—which, in turn, have been sup-
pressed by federal military intervention in order to enforce civil
rights.
Again, by international analogy, those incidents deemed to
warrant humanitarian intervention abroad are all marked by a
grave violation of human rights and, thereby, a critical disruption
of law and order; however, a fine distinction can be made between
those incidents where rights violations were the primary justification
for intervention (as with civil rights enforcement at home) and
those where rights violations were incident to large-scale unrest (as
with “race riots”). For instance, there is an analogous distinction
between those incidents deemed just causes on account of the
grave violation of human rights, as in the genocides in Bosnia, Ko-
sovo, and Rwanda, and those incidents deemed such on account of
violent insurgencies or clashes that required suppression in order
to restore law and order (and thereby enforce human rights), as in
Somalia.
Accordingly, this article categorizes as “race riots” those inci-
dents where suppressing a race-related civil disturbance was the pri-
ority of federal military intervention, regardless of whether
presumed or apparent civil rights violations brought about or were
implicit in the disturbance. Those incidents that meet such criteria
are: the violent clashes in Bleeding Kansas; anti-Chinese expulsion
campaigns in the Northwest; the Detroit race riots of 1943 and
1967; riots in Baltimore and Washington, D.C. following the assassi-
nation of Martin Luther King, Jr.; looting in St. Croix in the after-
math of Hurricane Hugo; and riots in Los Angeles in the wake of
the Rodney King verdict.158 With the exception of the Hurricane
nate such incidents as “rebellions” or “uprisings” to indicate the socio-economic and
civil-rights related grievances that may underlie them and, thereby, the righteous in-
dignation behind such disturbances. Neutral descriptors such as “unrest” or “civil dis-
turbance,” accordingly, have been used to sidestep the contention that can arise from
designating an incident a “race riot.” Nonetheless, the term is used here to highlight
larger claims made in this article about race and state sovereignty illustrated through
the history of insurrection.
158 See, e.g., Vivienne M. Baulch & Patricia Zacharias, The 1943 Detroit Race Riots,
Detroit News: Mich. Hist. (Feb. 10, 1999, 8:00 PM), http://blogs.detroitnews.com/
history/1999/02/10/the-1943-detroit-race-riots/ [https://perma.cc/79H6-2E26];
William Branigin, Hurricane Hugo Haunts Virgin Islands, WASH. POST (Oct. 31, 1989),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/hurricane/archives/
hugo89a.htm [https://perma.cc/72LM-C5W6]; Kathleen Koch, Nation’s Capital Still
Recovering from 1968 Riots, CNN (Apr. 4, 1998, 2:16 PM), http://www.cnn.com/US/
9804/04/mlk.dc.riots [https://perma.cc/6VS3-UADX]; People and Events: Bleeding
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Hugo incident, federal military intervention in all of the above was
at the request of the state governor, and—though they collectively
raised less concern among state officials over the legitimacy of such
intervention—they were nonetheless the subject of controversy.
Several of the above incidents—namely, the Detroit riots, the
riots following Martin Luther King, Jr.’s assassination, and the Los
Angeles riots—are well-known and commonly understood to be
‘race riots’. They are notable for the purposes of this article in that
they illustrate the trend discussed above: race-related civil distur-
bances deemed insurrections for the purposes of authorizing fed-
eral military intervention (by local invitation) to enforce law and
order disrupted by non-state actors. Indeed, federal military inter-
vention in each of these instances was authorized at the behest of
the respective state governor. Further, notwithstanding that inter-
vention in these instances was requested by state officials, the rhet-
oric of public speeches (and private discussions) indicates the
controversial nature of the insurrection proclamation.
With the exception of the proclamation made attendant to the
Detroit riot of 1943,159 all of the remaining proclamations include
substantially overlapping language advising that “the law enforce-
ment resources available to the City and State, including the Na-
tional Guard, have been unable to suppress such acts of violence
and to restore law and order”160—language which signals that fed-
eral military intervention was a last resort. Such framing is evident in
a transcript of President Johnson’s conversations with advisers and
relevant state governors in the midst of riots sparked by Martin Lu-
ther King, Jr.’s assassination. In discussing plans for the domestic
deployment of troops to suppress the riots, President Johnson in-
structed Mayor Richard Daley of Chicago that the governor of Illi-
Kansas, 1853-1861, PBS.ORG, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/aia/part4/4p2952.html
[https://perma.cc/AK2R-6Y32]; Robert Reinhold, Riots in Los Angeles: The Overview;
As Rioting Mounted, Gates Remained at Political Event, N.Y. TIMES (May 5, 1992), http://
www.nytimes.com/1992/05/05/us/riots-los-angeles-overview-rioting-mounted-gates-
remained-political-event.html [https://perma.cc/ZHE3-3FR4]; Kie Relyea, Remember-
ing Washington’s Chinese Expulsion 125 Years Later, SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 7, 2010, 9:46
AM) http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/remembering-washingtons-chinese-
expulsion-125-years-later [https://perma.cc/S99R-7ULC].
159 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Proclamation No. 2588, Directing Detroit Race Rioters to
Disperse (June 23, 1953), in AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Gerhard Peters & John T.
Woolley eds., 2017), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=16414
[https://perma.cc/9VL6-MASJ].
160 See, e.g., Lyndon B. Johnson, Proclamation 384, Law and Order in the State of
Illinois (Apr. 7, 1968), in AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley
eds., 2017), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=106125 [https://
perma.cc/LYM4-ARW5].
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nois would have to make a “finding” that the state had “used all [its
National] Guard, that [it had] used all [its] facilities, that [it is]
unable to take care of the situation . . . .”161 President Johnson’s
reticence was even more apparent as to civil disturbances in De-
troit, where Michigan governor and presidential hopeful George
Romney vacillated on formally requesting the deployment of fed-
eral troops. Given his political aspirations, Governor Romney, on
the one hand, was loath to admit that the riots had escalated to a
level beyond his control; and President Johnson, on the other
hand, was generally averse to the domestic deployment of troops
and, accordingly, insisted on Romney’s formal request to exercise
this exceptional measure.162
In some instances, the then-president further emphasized that
such intervention was not authorized in order to enforce civil
rights, but for the sole purpose of stemming criminal activity. For
instance, in response to the Detroit riots of 1967, President John-
son supplemented the proclamation of insurrection with a public
address noting that such action was taken with the “greatest regret”
and assuring that “[p]illage, looting, murder, and arson have noth-
ing to do with civil rights,” but were “criminal conduct.”163 Similar
qualifications were used long after the decade characterized by the
161 Johnson Conversation with Richard Daley on Apr 06, 1968 (WH6804.01), MILLER
CTR., http://archive.millercenter.org/presidentialrecordings/lbj-wh6804.01-12910
[https://perma.cc/EDR9-7EGN].
162 JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR., THE TRIUMPH AND TRAGEDY OF LYNDON JOHNSON: THE
WHITE HOUSE YEARS 212-13 (1991) (“Johnson could have ignored Romney’s vacilla-
tion and political maneuvering. He had the constitutional and legal authority to de-
ploy troops. He had only to determine that the situation was out of control, order the
rioters to disperse, and if they did not, send in troops. But . . . . Johnson did not like
to use military troops in domestic disorders. He believed that local and state authori-
ties should maintain order. He couldn’t stand the thought of American soldiers kill-
ing American civilians. . . . Romney was reluctant to ‘request’ the President to deploy
troops and he refused to admit that he was ‘unable’ to maintain order in Detroit.
Johnson insisted on a written request. Finally, Romney sent a telegram to the Presi-
dent, ‘I hereby officially request the immediate deployment of federal troops. . . .
There is reasonable doubt that we can suppress the existing looting, arson and snip-
ing without the assistance of federal troops.’”).
163 Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks to the Nation After Authorizing the Use of Fed-
eral Troops in Detroit (July 24, 1967), in AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Gerhard Peters &
John T. Woolley eds., 2017), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=28364
[https://perma.cc/2SEV-2AWS] (“I am sure the American people will realize that I
take this action with the greatest regret—and only because of the clear, unmistakable,
and undisputed evidence that Governor Romney of Michigan and the local officials in
Detroit have been unable to bring the situation under control. Law enforcement is a
local matter. It is the responsibility of local officials and the Governors of the respec-
tive States. The Federal Government should not intervene—except in the most ex-
traordinary circumstances.”).
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civil rights movement; in the midst of the L.A. riots, President
George H.W. Bush stated in a public address that the unrest was
“not about civil rights,” but, rather, “the brutality of a mob, pure
and simple.”164 Such distinctions, it can be inferred, were publicly
made in order to help legitimize federal military intervention
before a watching public, which, perhaps, might have associated
such intervention with the controversial proclamations of insurrec-
tion attendant to past enforcements of civil rights.
For the sake of brevity, this section will discuss in detail those
incidents that are either less well known and/or less commonly un-
derstood to be “race riots”: (a) violent clashes in “Bleeding Kan-
sas,” (b) anti-Chinese expulsion campaigns in the Northwest, and
(c) looting in St. Croix in the aftermath of Hurricane Hugo.
a. Bleeding Kansas
On February 11, 1856, President Franklin Pierce issued a proc-
lamation ordering the dispersal of persons obstructing law and or-
der in Kansas.165 The proclamation addressed the violent clashes
between pro- and anti-slavery factions in a conflict known as
“Bleeding Kansas,” which arose after the 1894 Kansas-Nebraska Act
effectively nullified the Missouri Compromise of 1820 by authoriz-
ing settlers to vote on whether slavery would be allowed in the
eponymous territories. In other words, the Kansas-Nebraska Act au-
thorized settlers of the new territories to decide whether slavery
would be sanctioned or prohibited by way of self-determination or,
as then termed, ‘popular sovereignty’.
Kansas, then, became a battleground. A pro-slavery faction in-
cluded armed “Border Ruffians” from the adjacent slaveholding
state of Missouri who flooded to the neighboring territory, voting
illegally and engaging in vigilante violence to ensure that the terri-
164 Address to the Nation on the Civil Disturbances in Los Angeles, California,
(May 1, 1992), in 1 PUB. PAPERS 685 (1992), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-
1992-book1/pdf/PPP-1992-book1-doc-pg685.pdf [https://perma.cc/MN4W-Q2PA]
(“What we saw last night and the night before in Los Angeles is not about civil rights.
It’s not about the great cause of equality that all Americans must uphold. It’s not a
message of protest. It’s been the brutality of a mob, pure and simple. And let me
assure you: I will use whatever force is necessary to restore order. What is going on in
L.A. must and will stop. As your President I guarantee you that this violence will
end.”). A video version of the speech is also available online. Bush on Los Angeles Riots,
HIST., http://www.history.com/speeches/bush-on-los-angeles-riots#bush-on-los-ange-
les-riots [https://perma.cc/34DR-HK9E].
165 Franklin Pierce, Proclamation No. 66, Law and Order in the Territory of Kansas
(Feb. 11, 1856), in AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley eds.,
2017), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=67740 [https://perma
.cc/MLE9-ACZC].
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tory would not become a haven for escaped slaves. Their antago-
nists were abolitionists, including both humanitarian associations
and armed guerrilla groups, the most notorious among them led
by John Brown.166 Violence and hotly contested elections ensued,
with the political arm of each faction establishing a separate legisla-
ture and constitution for the territory.167
As to Bleeding Kansas, federal military intervention was ini-
tially proposed in November 1855 by Kansas territorial governor
Wilson Shannon, a pro-slavery sympathizer. In his capacity as com-
mander-in-chief of the state militia, Shannon had called forth a
posse comitatus of armed men from bordering Missouri to help sup-
press an insurrection of abolitionist groups assembling within the
free state settlement of Lawrence; thereafter, the territorial gover-
nor had become overwhelmed by the ensuing unrest and re-
quested that President Pierce dispatch federal troops to help
restore order.168
The president had been hesitant to heed this call, wary of the
public appearance of targeting citizens with the force of the federal
military. Moreover, anticipating the 1856 presidential election,
President Pierce had been politically invested in the “success” of
popular sovereignty in the territory. In light of such concerns, the
president authorized federal troops in the territory to serve under
the control of Governor Shannon, and in strict adherence to the
text of the presidential proclamation and relevant territorial law.
In effect, then, federal law enforcement was implemented at the
behest and pleasure of the pro-slavery territorial governor.169
166 See Pottawatomie Massacre, PBS: AM. EXPERIENCE, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh//
amex/brown/peopleevents/pande07.html [https://perma.cc/AV9A-TAQS]; see also
People and Events: Bleeding Kansas, 1853-1861, supra note 158.
167 “In fact what has been done is of revolutionary character. It is avowedly so in
motive and in aim as respects the local law of the Territory. It will become treasonable
insurrection if it reach the length of organized resistance by force to the fundamental
or any other Federal law and to the authority of the General Government. In such an
event the path of duty for the Executive is plain. The Constitution requiring him to
take care that the laws of the United States be faithfully executed, if they be opposed
in the Territory of Kansas he may, and should, place at the disposal of the marshal any
public force of the United States which happens to be within the jurisdiction, to be
used as a portion of the posse comitatus; and if that do not suffice to maintain order,
then he may call forth the militia of one or more States for that object, or employ for
the same object any part of the land or naval force of the United States.” Franklin
Pierce, Special Message (Jan. 24, 1856), in AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Gerhard Peters &
John T. Woolley eds., 2017), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=67636
[https://perma.cc/6MR2-EVX3].
168 MICHAEL L. TATE, THE FRONTIER ARMY IN THE SETTLEMENT OF THE WEST 83-84
(1999).
169 Franklin Pierce, Proclamation No. 66, Law and Order in the Territory of Kansas
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Accordingly, among the more notorious displays of federal
military intervention was the use of federal troops on July 4, 1856
to “disperse” the Topeka convention of a free-state legislative fac-
tion, which had been convened to contest and counteract the offi-
cial pro-slavery territorial government.170 This deployment sparked
controversy, with Northern abolitionist sympathizers criticizing the
use of federal military force to uphold a pro-slavery government,
and Southern pro-slavery supporters wary of the potential for fed-
eral troops to be increasingly used to suppress the incursions of
border ruffians and other similarly-aligned factions. Moreover, in
the end, President Pierce’s perceived bungling of the situation in
the Kansas territory – in part, occasioned by his hesitancy and lack
of leadership in failing to assert executive control over the federal
military response therein – contributed to his losing the Demo-
cratic presidential primary.171
b. Anti-Chinese Expulsion
President Grover Cleveland issued two presidential proclama-
tions in response to the organized expulsion of Chinese laborers
from Washington State in the mid-1880s. Amid an economic down-
turn that hit the Northwest Pacific region, Chinese residents—who
had largely migrated to help build the region’s transcontinental
railroad—became scapegoats for anxious white laborers who
blamed them for driving down wages and, thereby, posing unfair
competition for available work. A wave of propaganda campaigns
by members and sympathizers of the Knights of Labor, a labor
union, recommended expulsion of Chinese laborers, a tactic which
gained significant public support.
The first proclamation, issued on November 7, 1885, con-
cerned the move by groups spurred by the Knights of Labor to
threaten and intimidate Chinese residents into leaving Tacoma,
Washington.172 On November 3 of that year—a few weeks after
three Chinese laborers were murdered and masked men torched
(Feb. 11, 1856), in AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley eds.,
2017), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=67740 [https://perma
.cc/MLE9-ACZC].
170 The Missouri-Kansas Conflict 1854-1865: Topeka Legislature Dispersed, CIV. WAR ON
WESTERN BORDER, http://www.civilwaronthewesternborder.org/timeline/topeka-leg-
islature-dispersed [https://perma.cc/T9RM-3PQT].
171 Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley, Election of 1856, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT,
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/showelection.php?year=1856 [https://perma.cc/
7QX8-RMPP].
172 Grover Cleveland, Proclamation No. 274, Law and Order in the Territory of
Washington (Nov. 7, 1885), in AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Gerhard Peters & John T.
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quarters where 37 Chinese workers resided—some 200 Chinese
persons were ordered to pack, escorted by Knights of Labor sup-
porters to a Northern Pacific railway, and forced to board a train to
Portland, Oregon.173 President Cleveland’s proclamation, which
was made at the request of the territorial governor of Washington,
stated “that by reason of unlawful obstructions and combinations
and the assemblage of evil-disposed persons” it had “become im-
practicable to enforce” the law.174 However, such “evil-disposed
people,” having completed their mission, wondered what federal
troops would do when they reached Tacoma: “‘What insurrec-
tion?’” asked perpetrators as they returned peaceably to their
homes. . . . ‘How will they manage to put down a people who are
not in rebellion?’ ‘Let them come,’ said the calm-minded. ‘We
shall be glad to see them. It will give the boys a change.’”175
The president’s second proclamation, which was also made at
the request of Washington’s territorial governor, similarly cited
“evil-disposed persons” whose unlawful obstructions and combina-
tions made it impracticable to enforce the law. Issued on February
9, 1886, the proclamation responded to a riot that erupted in Seat-
tle after local members and sympathizers of the Knights of Labor
attempted to expel Chinese laborers using the “Tacoma
Method.”176 On February 7, such perpetrators had marauded
through Seattle’s Chinese neighborhood and threatened residents
to depart on a steamship leaving that afternoon. However, after
plans were made to postpone the expulsion for the following day,
the intended departure was further disrupted by violent clashes be-
tween Knight-supporters and white parties who sought to put a
Woolley eds., 2017), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=71275
[https://perma.cc/BSD4-YAY8].
173 See GWEN WHITING, WASH. STATE HISTORY MUSEUM, THE CHINESE EXPULSION ACT
OF 1882, http://www.washingtonhistory.org/files/library/chineseexclusion_001.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5YL3-Z2W8]; see also David W. Chen, Picturing the Remnants of Anti-
Chinese Violence, N.Y. TIMES: LENS (Aug. 13, 2012), https://lens.blogs.nytimes.com/
2012/08/13/remnants-of-anti-chinese-violence [https://perma.cc/FPJ2-JTXQ].
174 Grover Cleveland, Proclamation No. 274, Law and Order in the Territory of
Washington (Nov. 7, 1885), in AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Gerhard Peters & John T.
Woolley eds., 2017), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=71275
[https://perma.cc/BSD4-YAY8].
175 Carlos A. Schwantes, Protest in a Promised Land: Unemployment, Disinheritance, and
the Origin of Labor Militancy in the Pacific Northwest, 1885-1886, 13 WESTERN HIST. Q.,
373, 383 (1982) (noting that a grand jury issued indictments pursuant to the Ku Klux
Klan Act of 1871, which resulted in no convictions).
176 Grover Cleveland, Proclamation No. 275, Intent to Use Force Against Unlawful
Assemblages in the Territory of Washington (Feb. 9, 1886), in AM. PRESIDENCY PRO-
JECT (Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley eds., 2017), http://www.presidency.ucsb
.edu/ws/index.php?pid=71415 [https://perma.cc/J2G8-FKMY].
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stop to the scheme. The ship ultimately departed with nearly 200
Chinese persons on board, but thereafter the opposing parties
clashed when Knight-supporters tried to escort the remaining Chi-
nese laborers off the dock to await the next ship, leaving five
wounded and one person dead.177
c. Hurricane Hugo
On September 20, 1989, President George H.W. Bush issued a
proclamation regarding domestic violence and disorder in the U.S.
Virgin Island of St. Croix that was “endangering life and property
and obstructing execution of the laws.”178 President Bush’s procla-
mation came after reports of looting and violence in St. Croix after
Hurricane Hugo hit landfall three days earlier on September 17.
The damage wrought by the hurricane severely impaired commu-
nications systems, making it difficult for Washington-based officials
to confirm conditions on the island. Accordingly, much of the in-
formation relied upon was communicated by ham radio operators.
Among circulated reports were incidents of racial violence enacted
by Black residents against white residents and tourists, which were
later determined to be exaggerated.179 While the precise nature of
civil disorder in the aftermath of the hurricane remained unclear,
it was undisputed that widespread looting had occurred,180 with lo-
cal police, National Guard troops,181 and even prominent citizens
177 Schwantes, supra note 175, at 382.
178 Proclamation No. 6023, 54 Fed. Reg. 39,153 (Sept. 20, 1989), reprinted in 103
Stat. 3093 (1989).
179 Jeffrey Schmalz, 3 Weeks After Storm, St. Croix Still Needs Troops, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9,
1989), http://www.nytimes.com/1989/10/09/us/3-weeks-after-storm-st-croix-still-
needs-troops.html [https://perma.cc/4GAY-TGJA] (“Federal officials say they believe
reports that some blacks, who make up 70 percent of the island’s population, had
shouted, ‘Whitey, go home!’ But they said that there was no indication that such en-
counters involved more than shouting, and the complaints were not being
pursued.”).
180 James Gerstenzang & Ronald J. Ostrow, Washington Officials Paint Grim Picture of
Chaos that Led to Approval of Troops, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 21, 1989), http://articles.latimes
.com/1989-09-21/news/mn-910_1_virgin-islands [https://perma.cc/Y4TV-VEQL]
(“While Hurricane Hugo’s destruction of communications links left details of the dis-
orders unclear, one Interior Department official reported that every store on St.
Croix appeared to have been looted.”).
181 Branigin, supra note 158 (“Most troubling for many people, however, was the
apparent insouciance of the police and National Guard, some of whose members
were looters, witnesses said. ‘I watched people looting while Gen. Moorehead was
standing right out there directing traffic’ a couple of blocks away, one U.S. law-en-
forcement official said angrily. At one point, the official said, ‘a guy with a National
Guard uniform told me to go into a store and ‘take what you need.’ Why? Because the
National Guard was looting, too.’”).
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having reportedly participated.182
News articles written at the time of the domestic disturbance
cited reports of hundreds of inmates who broke out of a hurricane-
damaged prison, “looters by the thousands” and “[f]leeing tourists
[telling] of chaos, long and heavy automatic weapons fire, robbers
with machetes and prisoners—including murderers—on the
loose.”183 Other sources quoted at the time reported that the loot-
ing was not solely opportunistic, but also need-oriented, engaged
in by residents who were running out of food and other necessary
provisions.184 The ensuing unrest, in any event, occurred against a
backdrop of racial tensions and socio-economic disparities between
the island’s resident population and seasonal tourists.
The presidential proclamation was silent on whether it had
been made at the request of the territorial governor of the U.S.
Virgin Islands, and news reports provide conflicting accounts.
While spokespersons for President Bush stated that the proclama-
tion was made at the request of Virgin Islands territorial governor
Alexander Farrelly, Farrelly responded that he had not made any
such request.185 In any event, on September 21, approximately
1,100 federal troops were deployed to the island to aid the Virgin
Islands National Guard and other local law enforcement.
As for indicated perceptions of legitimacy, some territorial of-
ficials criticized the federal deployment, which they argued di-
verted necessary resources from relief missions to security
182 Id. (“The breakdown in order after the hurricane also has prompted much soul-
searching about the behavior of Crucians, as people of St. Croix are known, since the
looters included not only poor residents of public housing projects but also promi-
nent citizens. The U.S. attorney’s office has charged 15 such persons with offenses
ranging from grand larceny to possession of stolen goods. They include a former St.
Croix senator and gubernatorial candidate who was police commander in Frederik-
sted at the time of his arrest, the vice president of a bank, a Christiansted civic leader
and a restaurant owner.”).
183 Bob Secter & Richard E. Meyer, St. Croix Chaos Subsides as U.S. Troops Arrive, L.A.
TIMES (Sept. 22, 1989), http://articles.latimes.com/1989-09-22/news/mn-673_1_st-
croix [https://perma.cc/E6Q9-9RFM].
184 Id. (“Some islanders have admitted that they joined in the looting because they
were afraid that if they didn’t they would have nothing to eat.”).
185 Gerstenzang & Ostrow, supra note 180 (“Farrelly said Wednesday night that he
had not asked for the troops Bush authorized.”); Marita Hernandez & Richard E.
Meyer, U.S. Orders in Troops to Quell Island Violence: St. Croix Looting and Lawlessness in
Wake of Hurricane Damage Spurs Authorization by Bush, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 21, 1989),
http://articles.latimes.com/1989-09-21/news/mn-890_1_virgin-islands [https://per
ma.cc/AS7G-VCE9] (“Presidential spokesman Marlin Fitzwater said Bush authorized
deployment after receiving a request for help from Virgin Islands Gov. Alexander
Farrelly. In Christiansted, the governor said he had not asked for federal help to re-
store order. But Holland Redfield, a Virgin Islands territorial senator and legislative
liaison to the White House, said he asked for assistance from Washington.”).
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operations. Territorial Governor Farrelly, for one, downplayed the
level of disorder on the ground.186 Further, non-voting House of
Representatives member Ron de Lugo criticized the media report-
age of the disruption on the island, “denounc[ing] the television
networks, Time Magazine, The New York Times, The Wall Street
Journal, The Miami Herald, The Chicago Tribune and other news
organization [sic], accusing them of concentrating on the looting
and exaggerating the extent of civil disorder.”187
C. Right Intention
When contemplating the legitimacy of humanitarian interven-
tion abroad, moral philosophers and critics of foreign policy, in
particular, have considered whether—independent of the underly-
ing circumstance deemed a “just cause”—such intervention was
made with the “right intention.” In other words, such scholars have
considered whether the “just cause” was merely a pretext for armed
intervention, which, accordingly, was not undertaken solely for hu-
manitarian purposes.188
Indeed, in the international context, it is understood that
states do not always engage in humanitarian intervention for
purely humanitarian purposes. Humanitarian intervention, for in-
stance, can be partly motivated by the pursuit of national interests
that do not encompass the intent to save lives and protect human
rights.189 Given the understanding that humanitarian intervention
is often prompted by such mixed motives, evaluations of right in-
tention have tended to adopt an empirical approach that considers
when such intervention has, and has not, been undertaken in light
of underlying circumstances that would seem to constitute a just
cause. Such evaluations, then, have adopted an inductive analysis
to consider when humanitarian intervention appears to have been
prompted by non-humanitarian national interests, on the one
186 Dennis Hevesi, Bush Dispatches Troops to Island in Storm’s Wake, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
21, 1989), http://www.nytimes.com/1989/09/21/us/bush-dispatches-troops-to-is-
land-in-storm-s-wake.html [https://perma.cc/PA28-NFX5] (“Governor Farrelly of the
Virgin Islands, speaking from his office in Charlotte Amalie on St. Thomas, about 30
miles north of St. Croix, acknowledged, ‘There is some looting, no doubt about that.
‘But,’ he added, ‘there is no near state of anarchy. And I should know. I’m in the
streets every day and I’m the Governor of this territory.’”).
187 Schmalz, supra note 179.
188 See, e.g., Gareth Evans & Mohamed Sahnoun, The Responsibility to Protect, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, Nov./Dec. 2002, at 100, 104, 109 (describing the relationship between right
intention and national interest in modern humanitarian intervention).
189 ANDREAS KRIEG, MOTIVATIONS FOR HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THEORETICAL
AND EMPIRICAL CONSIDERATIONS 37-58 (2013) (ebook).
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hand, or, on the other hand, has not been undertaken due to the
lack of both national self-interest and political will.
It could be posited that considerations of right intention at
play in the international context are not suitable for the domestic
context. At home, one would imagine, the federal government’s
response in protecting its own citizens in a crisis scenario would
not only be politically uncontroversial, but would also be fairly uni-
form in tactical application, in line with the singular and incontro-
vertible motive of protecting any and all citizens in a given
emergency. However, just as an empirical analysis of humanitarian
intervention (e.g., in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Somalia) and its absence
(e.g., in Rwanda) supports an inductive evaluation of the interna-
tional community’s political priorities, relative indifference, and
blind spots, a similar analysis of the nature of federal intervention
at home, as discussed in more detail below, not only reveals a curi-
ous trend, but also suggests a disparity as to which crises warrant
certain kinds of responses.
This section considers the ‘right intention’ of domestic federal
military intervention through a similar inductive analysis—here,
with a select consideration of the application of the Stafford Act to
govern the federal response to incidents that, on their face, could
constitute instances of domestic violence or other obstruction of
federal law or the enjoyment of constitutional rights that would
warrant the invocation of the Insurrection Act. Such an analysis,
albeit cursory and speculative, is nonetheless useful in light of the
stated legislative purposes of the Stafford Act and the Insurrection
Act, respectively, which frame the nature of federal military
intervention.
Again, while the Insurrection Act authorizes the deployment
of federal troops with law enforcement powers, the Stafford Act
does not—a key distinction that is evident in the text of each stat-
ute and, further, is translated in the rules of engagement estab-
lished under the authority of one or both acts. As for the legislative
text itself, while the Insurrection Act authorizes the deployment of
federal troops to “suppress insurrection” and otherwise quell “do-
mestic violence,”190 such troops may be deployed under the Staf-
ford Act in accordance with the ultimate purposes to “save lives”
and “alleviate . . . suffering.”191 While such text does not necessarily
dictate specific behaviors of every federal military responder on the
ground, the legislative authorization does frame the overall mission,
190 10 U.S.C. § 333 (2008).
191 42 U.S.C. § 5121(b) (2007).
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casting intervention as the use of military force to restore law and
order, on the one hand, or to provide emergency relief in order to
save lives, on the other.
The following subsection briefly considers select incidents of
arguably insurrectionary character that were solely deemed either
natural or man-made disasters under the Stafford Act. This subsec-
tion, moreover, is not intended to provide evidence per se of selec-
tive federal law enforcement, but to raise for discussion the
potential for such selective enforcement and the implications in
light of the fraught history of race and sovereignty of the several
states.
1. Selective Enforcement
Instances of domestic violence in the United States that were
not proclaimed insurrections are numerous; this article does not
consider them all. Rather, this inquiry of right intention, similar to
that offered by commentators on and critics of humanitarian inter-
vention abroad, is episodic and speculative, intended to raise issues
for further discussion rather than to make definitive conclusions.
Accordingly, while the Stafford Act, passed in 1988, has applied to
incidents that arose over a far shorter span of time than the Insur-
rection Act of 1807, it is nonetheless, for the purposes of this arti-
cle, a useful benchmark for considering the potential for selective
federal law enforcement.
Though the Stafford Act has been generally applied to author-
ize federal response to natural disasters—such as hurricanes,
floods, and flash fires—there are only three instances since the legis-
lation was enacted in which it was applied to respond to civil distur-
bances, specifically, three acts of domestic terrorism: the
Oklahoma City Bombing, the 1993 attack on the World Trade
Center, and the events of September 11, 2001.
On April 19, 1995, a car bomb detonated and destroyed the
Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, killing 169
people, including nineteen children, and injuring 500.192 On the
same day, President Bill Clinton made a unilateral declaration of
“emergency” under the Stafford Act.193 The next day, on April 20,
192 April 19, 1995 — Timothy McVeigh Bombs Oklahoma City Building, N.Y. TIMES: THE
LEARNING NETWORK (Apr. 19, 2002, 4:02 AM), https://learning.blogs.nytimes.com/
2012/04/19/april-19-1995-timothy-mcveigh-bombs-oklahoma-city-building [https://
perma.cc/E2EN-CSSL].
193 William J. Clinton, Remarks on the Bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal
Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma (Apr. 19, 1995), in AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT
(Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley eds., 2017), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/
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1995, the Department of the Army transmitted an executive order
for military support to civil authorities in Oklahoma City, citing the
Stafford Act as legal authority. As for the World Trade Center At-
tacks, President Bill Clinton declared a “major disaster” after a car
bomb was detonated on February 26, 1993 in the garage of the
World Trade Center, killing six people and injuring about 1,000
others.194 In response to the events of September 11, 2001, Presi-
dent George W. Bush declared a “major disaster.”195 There was no
proclamation of insurrection in relation to these attacks; rather, on
that date, President Bush further declared a national emergency
under the National Emergencies Act,196 pursuant to which he
called upon state governors to activate National Guard troops to
patrol airports, train stations, and other transportation depots
under Title 32, thereby federally compensating such troops for any
law enforcement activities they engaged in under state command.
Accordingly, patrolling National Guard troops, though a regular
presence in the months following the attacks, were not engaged in
federal law enforcement.
The above incidents are noteworthy comparators in that they
involved acts of grave domestic violence that—while they elicited a
robust security response—were not deemed “insurrections” under
the Insurrection Act and, thereby, were not subject to federal law
enforcement pursuant to the legislation. However, as will be illus-
index.php?pid=51239 [https://perma.cc/549R-XAB3]. Prior to President Clinton’s
declaration, the Department of Defense had already provided assistance to state and
local authorities pursuant to its “immediate action authority” to respond to emergen-
cies in order to “save lives, [to] prevent human suffering, or [to] mitigate great prop-
erty damage” when time does not permit for necessary prior approvals. See Jim
Winthrop, The Oklahoma City Bombing: Immediate Response Authority and Other Military
Assistance to Civil Authority (MACA), ARMY LAW., July 1997, at 1, 4. Such assistance in-
cluded the dispatch of explosive ordnance personnel, two bomb detection dog teams,
and a 66-person rescue team. Thereafter, the primary efforts of the Department of
Defense included providing airlift assets for FEMA’s search and rescue teams. Id. at 1,
1 n.5.
194 William J. Clinton, The President’s Radio Address (Feb. 27, 1993), in AM. PRESI-
DENCY PROJECT (Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley eds., 2017), http://www.presi-
dency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=46253 [https://perma.cc/QV2L-WQ45]; see also
Press Release, President Declares Disasters in Nebraska and New York (Apr. 2, 1993),
https://clinton6.nara.gov/1993/04/1993-04-02-president-declares-disasters-in-ne-
braska-and-new-york.html [https://perma.cc/37RK-BLVY] (“President Clinton today
declared major disasters exist in both the state of New York following the Feb. 26
bombing of the World Trade Center and in Nebraska as a result of severe March
flooding and ice jams.”).
195 Bush Declares Major Disaster in New York, USA TODAY (Sept. 11, 2001, 10:22 PM),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2001/09/11/nyc-disaster.htm
[https://perma.cc/KM9C-WVVD].
196 Proclamation No. 7463, 66 Fed. Reg. 48,199 (Sept. 14, 2001).
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trated with the case of Hurricane Andrew, the disparity is not
merely semantic, but can translate into differences in the permissi-
ble use of force by federal troops on the ground. Hurricane An-
drew struck Florida in August 1992, especially devastating south
Dade County, a suburban part of the Miami metropolitan area
where the population was about 50% Hispanic residents, 30% non-
Hispanic white residents, and 19% Black residents.197
President George H.W. Bush made a proclamation of “major
disaster” pursuant to the Stafford Act on August 24, 1992, the same
day the hurricane hit landfall in South Florida with winds at an
estimated 168 miles per hour.198 There were numerous reports of
looting in the days after the hurricane hit. Though official statistics
on the extent of the looting remain uncertain, news stories from
that time highlighted an atmosphere pervaded by fear and per-
ceived lawlessness—with reports that signs painted on homes and
other buildings read “You loot, we shoot” or “Looters will lose body
parts,” and at least one man presumed to be a looter having been
shot dead by a South Florida resident.199 At the height of the crisis,
then-governor of Florida, Lawton Chiles, dispatched approximately
5000 of the state’s National Guard troops to secure areas report-
edly besieged by looting, including to guard the Cutler Ridge
Mall.200 In response to the governor’s request for additional active-
duty troops to Florida without, notably, making a proclamation of
insurrection in order to confer law enforcement powers to such
troops, federal troops dispatched to the area pursuant to the Staf-
ford Act were armed with weaponry that lacked ammunition. As re-
ported in The Miami Herald, members of the 82nd Airborne
Division—who were armed with M-16 rifles but had not been is-
197 RESEARCH & PLANNING SECTION, MIAMI DEP’T OF PLANNING & ZONING, DEMO-
GRAPHIC PROFILE MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA 1960-2000 10 (2003).
198 George H.W. Bush, Remarks on Disaster Assistance for Florida Following Hurri-
cane Andrew (Aug. 24, 1992), in AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Gerhard Peters & John T.
Woolley eds., 2017), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=21360
[https://perma.cc/HY3Q-RHDV]. For a discussion of the wind speeds, see Mark Silva
et al., Destruction at Dawn: What Hurricane Andrew Did to South Florida 24 Years Ago,
MIAMI HERALD (Aug. 24, 2015, 9:09 AM), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/
weather/hurricane/article32006499.html [https://perma.cc/RUS4-XYJU].
199 See, e.g., Gary Nelson, Hurricane Andrew Remembered: 20 Years Later, CBS MIAMI
(Aug. 24, 2012, 7:19 PM), http://miami.cbslocal.com/2012/08/24/hurricane-an-
drew-remembered-20-years-later/ [https://perma.cc/B4QD-4SYV]; Silva et al., supra
note 198; Deborah Sontag, After the Storm; The Days of a Scavenger Amid the Rubble, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 1, 1992), http://www.nytimes.com/1992/09/01/us/after-the-storm-the-
days-of-a-scavenger-amid-the-rubble.html [https://perma.cc/24DT-RWL4];
200 Ardy Friedberg & Kevin Davis, Looting Heavy Despite Police Presence, SUN SENTINEL
(Aug. 26, 1992), http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/1992-08-26/news/9201170778_1_
looters-florida-national-guard-troopers [https://perma.cc/5TLA-WDUC].
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sued ammunition—were confronted by an armed gang in South
Dade County; though the confrontation was diffused, a captain of
the division recalling the incident noted that “[o]ne of these times,
somebody’s going to call our bluff, and someone’ll get shot . . . .”201
Again, that the aforementioned incidents were not pro-
claimed insurrections is not evidence per se of selective federal law
enforcement. However, in light of “insurrections” and would-be
“insurrections” that are similarly situated—namely Hurricane
Hugo and Hurricane Katrina—and acts of domestic terrorism that
pose arguably graver security risks, these incidents raise for serious
discussion the potential for selective federal law enforcement and
at least illustrate the fraught tension between race and the sover-
eignty of the several states.
II. PARADOXES OF SOVEREIGNTY AND CITIZENSHIP
Part I of this article applied the conceptual framework devel-
oped to guide humanitarian intervention abroad to domestic fed-
eral military intervention authorized under the Insurrection Act—
or, as termed herein, humanitarian intervention at home. As dis-
cussed in detail above, executive decision-making regarding do-
mestic federal military intervention raises similar questions of legal
authority, just cause, and right intention, and, moreover, illumi-
nates the fraught relationship between race and federalism. Again,
the ostensibly clear legal authority for the executive to deploy fed-
eral troops with law enforcement powers is, in practice, vague—
rendering “insurrection” tautological. So, as a just cause is, in effect,
what the executive proclaims one to be, an overview of past inci-
dents deemed “insurrections” helps define the otherwise slippery
term, revealing that such crises have tended to either involve the
violation of civil rights or so-called ‘race riots’. Furthermore, the
application of this conceptual framework subjects the purported
humanitarian intention behind such federal military intervention
to a deductive inquiry, in that, when considering arguably similarly
situated incidents that were not all deemed “insurrections,” the
specter of selective enforcement is raised. In other words, the em-
pirical association between “insurrection” and race—in particular,
the civil rights of, or civil disturbances involving, Black citizens—
might, as with Hurricane Katrina, reframe a mission to provide
emergency relief (i.e., humanitarian aid) as one to restore law and
order (i.e., humanitarian intervention).
201 Peter Slevin, The Army vs. The Gangs, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 6, 1992, at 1A.
448 CUNY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:389
Part II of this article further develops this implicit analogy be-
tween humanitarian intervention abroad and federal military inter-
vention at home to speculate on two paradoxes that emerge from
this conceptual exercise—one of sovereignty and another of citi-
zenship. The definition of a paradox, of course, is a statement that
is seemingly contradictory or opposed to common sense and, yet, is
perhaps true. As for the sovereignty of the several states, while it
would appear that federal military intervention during a crisis
should be uncontroversial given the clear legal authority to inter-
vene, the political fallout of doing such renders state sovereignty
far less penetrable than would be expected—akin, perhaps, to that
of the sovereignty of a foreign state. As to citizenship, while the
federal government’s responsibility to protect all citizens within
U.S. borders is unequivocal and expected to be fulfilled uniformly,
an overview of the nature of federal military intervention in re-
sponse to a given domestic crisis illustrates an ongoing contest over
the incorporation of Black citizens into the nation-state, the legacy
of which might result in disparate regimes of federal intervention
where Black citizens are concerned, with the primary intention to
restore law and order trumping that to save lives.
A. Sovereignty of the Several States
The paradox of sovereignty, illustrated in Part I, is that—
where usurping police powers are concerned—the potential politi-
cal fallout of violating the sovereignty of the several states appears
to pose as much as, or perhaps more of, a constraint on federal
military intervention at home as it does on humanitarian interven-
tion abroad. This statement, seemingly absurd yet well-founded,
may explain, in the case of Hurricane Katrina, the slow provision of
federal assistance. This statement, moreover, poses an answer to
Soledad O’Brien’s question as to why, apparently, such federal as-
sistance was swiftly provided to tsunami victims in Indonesia rela-
tive to Louisiana.202
Such hesitancy, as discussed above, appears to arise when mili-
tary intervention is framed under the Insurrection Act—which au-
thorizes federal troops to engage in law enforcement—rather than
solely in accordance with the Stafford Act—where, in line with
Posse Comitatus restrictions, any federal troops deployed thereun-
der are not authorized to engage in law enforcement activity. The
nature of this hesitancy, as explored above is two-fold: arising, on
202 See note 10 and accompanying text supra.
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the one hand, out of a longstanding and perhaps race-neutral aver-
sion (expressed in The Federalist Papers and otherwise) to the exer-
cise of federal military power within the several states, and, on the
other hand, out of a fraught, racial history whereby, in practice,
federal law enforcement was repeatedly authorized to either en-
force civil rights of Black citizens or suppress so-called ‘race riots’.
As for the apparently race-neutral source of this hesitancy, an
overview of past invocations of the Insurrection Act reveals a will
on the part of the state governor of a given state to appear to his or
her constituency to possess control over the police powers of the
state. Moreover, given such politically motivated will, this overview
also reveals a reluctance on the part of the executive to usurp such
police powers from the state governor without having been re-
quested to do so. Such hesitancy, in short, appears to arise, in part,
out of classic federalist concerns. As raised in The Federalist Papers,
even the establishment of federal troops sparked fears over their
use to overpower state governments and forcibly restrain individual
liberty. For instance, during Radical Reconstruction, the aforemen-
tioned “spectacle of soldiers ‘marching’” into a New Orleans as-
sembly chamber and “‘expelling members at the point of
bayonet’” aroused sufficient aversion among then-Republican con-
gressmen to set in motion the withdrawal of federal troops from
former Confederate states.203 State governors who resisted the
court-ordered desegregation of public schools employed fiery rhet-
oric representing the use of federal troops to enforce civil rights as
an unjust encroachment of federal power. The deployment of such
troops was referred to as “military occupation” in Arkansas, as a
move to “invade Alabama” and, according to the governor of Mis-
sissippi, an employment of “naked and arbitrary power” denying a
“right of self-determination in the conduct of the affairs of our sov-
ereign state.”204
Further, the executive aversion to violating the sovereignty of
Alabama led President Johnson to reframe ultimate federal mili-
tary intervention as a response to a ‘local invitation’ by Governor
Wallace rather than a unilateral proclamation of insurrection. Spe-
cifically, after Governor Wallace declined to deploy the National
Guard to enforce the rights of protestors subjected to violence by
state troopers, President Johnson reframed his later proclamation
as having been made on account of an ‘unwillingness’ of the state
203 FONER, supra note 100, at 554.
204 DAVID NIVEN, THE POLITICS OF INJUSTICE: THE KENNEDYS, THE FREEDOM RIDES,
AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF A MORAL COMPROMISE 151 (2003).
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to intervene that was tantamount to a request.205 Even where fed-
eral military intervention was at the request of a given state gover-
nor—as in the case of ‘race riots’—in some instances, the executive
was at least rhetorically tentative in heeding this request. In the
case of Bleeding Kansas, President Pierce was hesitant to heed the
call of territorial governor Shannon to dispatch federal troops to
restore law and order, wary of the public appearance of targeting
citizens with federal military force.206 As for the Detroit riots of
1967, after state governor George Romney requested a proclama-
tion of insurrection, President Johnson, for one, was reluctant to
domestically deploy federal troops and, further, made clear in the
proclamation’s written text that “the law enforcement resources
available to the City and State, including the National Guard” were
unable to restore law and order, indicating that federal military
intervention as a ‘last resort’.207
B. Disparate Responses to U.S. Citizens
The paradox of citizenship illustrated in this article is three-
fold. For one, following from the paradox of sovereignty, an over-
view of the past proclamations of “insurrection” and their
attendant controversy reveals that—where federal military inter-
vention has been contemplated—it could, counter-intuitively, be
more efficient for the federal government to respond to crises
abroad than to crises at home. As discussed in detail above, U.S.
presidents have generally shown reluctance at employing the ex-
ceptional power to domestically deploy federal troops. Moreover,
even where such deployment has been at the request of the rele-
vant state governor, U.S. presidents have generally been prudent to
inform the public that this exceptional authority was not exercised
unilaterally, and, in some cases, reassure the public that such inter-
vention was not made to enforce ‘civil rights’.
Second, the uncovered pattern of past “insurrections”—
namely, civil rights ‘crises’ and so-called ‘race riots’—evidences the
ongoing contest over the incorporation of Black persons into the
body politic, and of such persons as, paradoxically, citizens consist-
ently struggling to be afforded and enjoy the full benefit of citizen-
ship.208 Indeed, a review of the invocation of the Insurrection Act
205 See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
206 See Part I.B.2.a. supra.
207 Proclamation No. 3795, 32 Fed. Reg. 10,905 (July 26, 1967).
208 DANIEL SIGWARD, FACING HISTORY AND OURSELVES, THE RECONSTRUCTION ERA
AND THE FRAGILITY OF DEMOCRACY 114 (2015), https://www.facinghistory.org/sites/
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reveals a marked trend as to what past presidents have deemed just
causes—that is, on the one hand, the enforcement of civil rights of
Black and other non-white persons in a given state (e.g., in Wash-
ington state to halt anti-Chinese expulsion campaigns; in Southern
states during the Reconstruction Era; in Alabama, Arkansas, and
Mississippi to desegregate public schools, as well as to enforce the
rights of protesters marching from Selma to Montgomery), and, on
the other hand, the suppression of ‘race riots’ that erupted in
states unable to restore law and order (e.g., in “Bleeding Kansas”
prior to the Civil War; the Detroit riots of 1943 and 1967; the un-
rest in cities across the United States after Martin Luther King, Jr.
was assassinated; and the Los Angeles riots).
In light of this history, the epigraph that begins this article
makes sense, rendering domestic federal military intervention par-
ticularly fraught where Black citizens are concerned. Again, regard-
ing Hurricane Katrina, President Bush hesitated as to whether
federal troops should have been deployed with the primary mission
to suppress an insurrection or to save lives. The events of Hurri-
cane Katrina, then, were indeterminate, representing at the same
time humanitarian crisis and ‘race riot’, an illegibility that held an
executive decision in abeyance for five crucial days. Just as mostly-
Black evacuees in New Orleans were, at once, resident and “refu-
gee,” stranded in a “third world country”209 at home, they were
also, at the same time, victims and perpetrators—impotent insur-
gents, internally-displaced insurrectionists, relief-seeking rioters.
Third—given the disparate invocation of the Insurrection Act,
on the one hand, and application of the Stafford Act, on the other,
to respond to similarly situated internal crises—this legacy may re-
sult in a disparate response to crisis where Black citizens are con-
cerned, with the primary intention to restore law and order
trumping that to save lives. The key distinction between the Insur-
rection Act and the Stafford Act—the presence or absence of law-
enforcement authority of federal troops—is implicit in the stated
purpose of each statute and indicative of the respective nature of
federal military intervention thereunder. Whereas federal troops
are deployed under the Insurrection Act to suppress “insurrec-
tions,” “rebellions” and “unlawful obstructions,” federal assistance
(military and otherwise), is provided under the Stafford Act simply
default/files/publications/The_Reconstruction_Era_and_The_Fragility_of_Democra
cy_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/5PGQ-RNYH].
209 Carr, supra note 5; Treaster & Sontag, supra note 6.
452 CUNY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:389
in order to “save lives” and “alleviate suffering.”210 In other words,
while the Insurrection Act authorizes the use of military force to
achieve humanitarian objectives, both the end and the means of
the Stafford Act are humanitarian in nature. Again, while the In-
surrection Act presumes federal military intervention of a combative
nature, the Stafford Act presumes federal intervention that,
whether military or non-military, is, by contrast, non-combative. This
distinction is important because the intention of federal disaster re-
sponse can reframe a mission from one to search-and-rescue to
shoot-to-kill.
In light of the above concern, a survey of incidents that have
been deemed “insurrections” begs questions about certain inci-
dents that have not. For instance, the bombings of a federal build-
ing in Oklahoma City and the World Trade Center in 1992, as well
as the events of September 11, 2001—each domestic acts of terror-
ism—were not proclaimed “insurrections.” Rather, these attacks
were solely interpreted as “man-made” disasters within the mean-
ing of the Stafford Act, and, thus, any federal military dispatched
thereunder lacked law-enforcement authority.211 Further, the Staf-
ford Act was solely applied to coordinate the federal response to
Hurricane Andrew in South Florida, where news media reported
rampant looting in South Dade County—an area in which approxi-
mately 70% of the residents were white or Hispanic according to
corresponding data.212 By contrast, the Insurrection Act was in-
voked to deploy federal troops to St. Croix amid the devastation of
Hurricane Hugo in response to media reports of looters menacing
tourist enclaves.213 St. Croix is among the U.S. Virgin Islands, an
unincorporated territory of the United States where approximately
85% of the residents were Black according to corresponding cen-
sus data. To the extent that an “insurrection” is in the eye of the
beholder, such incidents raise for serious discussion the apparent
racial implications of federal military enforcement.
CONCLUSION
“Legal interpretive acts signal and occasion the imposition of
violence upon others[,]” wrote Robert M. Cover in Violence and the
Word.214 Interpretations of the law, Cover further stated, results in
210 See supra notes 190-91 and accompanying text.
211 See supra notes 192-96 and accompanying text.
212 See supra notes 197-201 and accompanying text.
213 See supra notes 178-87 and accompanying text.
214 Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, in NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW:
THE ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER 203, 203 (Martha Minow et al. eds., 1993).
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the sanctioned loss of freedom, property, one’s children and even
one’s life. “When interpreters have finished their work, they fre-
quently leave behind victims whose lives have been torn apart by
these organized, social practices of violence.”215 As discussed in this
article, an “insurrection” is a state-authorized utterance that results
in the deployment of federal troops to “restore law and order”—a
mission that both implies and surely is expected to result in vio-
lence. This particular imposition of violence has been controver-
sial, as it represents a threatening exercise of federal power that
was formally constrained in this country’s founding documents.
The hesitancy to proclaim an insurrection discussed in this article,
in light of humanitarian intervention abroad, illustrates a paradox
of sovereignty: the enigmatic situation where the sovereignty of the
several states appears to be given more respect relative to the sover-
eignty of foreign states. Furthermore, despite this hesitancy to pro-
claim an insurrection, the proclamation has been made time and
again in order to either enforce civil rights or suppress race riots,
suggesting a paradox of citizenship – i.e., illustrating the ongoing
contest over the incorporation of Black citizens into the American
body politic, as “citizens” who are not afforded the full enjoyment
of citizenship.
While Hurricane Katrina was a point of entry into this discus-
sion—bringing to the fore, among other things, the question of
selective enforcement (i.e., racial profiling) in the executive deci-
sion to view hurricane victims as persons with lives to be saved or
insurgents disrupting law and order, more recent events further
raise the question of disparate responses to internal disturbances.
Juxtaposing the responses to Black protesters in Ferguson, Mis-
souri and Baltimore, Maryland, on the one hand, and the armed
occupation of the Oregon wildlife refuge by white militants, on the
other hand, shows the stark contrast in the use of force or, as Cover
put it, “the imposition of violence” on “insurrectionary” actors of
racial difference.
Finally, in this new paradigm under a Trump presidency,
Cover’s words are even more resonant. To the extent a president is
uninhibited by traditional and historical constraints on the exer-
cise of the Insurrection Act, the heart and mind of the particular
interpreter—i.e., the one who is proclaiming the “insurrection”—
becomes less of a speculative side point and more of a legal prior-
ity. Given that President Trump has promised to be the “law and
order” president who will, for example, “send in the Feds!” to Chi-
215 Id.
454 CUNY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:389
cago and into “inner cities” in order to address gun violence,216 the
racial implications of the Insurrection Act may become yet more
stark.
216 See, e.g., Nikita Vladimirov, Trump: ‘I Will Send in the Feds’ if Chicago Doesn’t Fix
Violence, HILL (Jan. 24, 2017, 9:52 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-
room/news/315994-trump-i-will-send-in-the-feds-if-chicago-doesnt-fix-carnage
[https://perma.cc/9RRH-FC94] (describing Donald Trump’s campaign as promising
“to bring ‘law and order’ to the country’s inner cities”); Donald Trump
(@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Jan. 24, 2017, 6:25 PM), https://twitter.com/real
DonaldTrump/status/824080766288228352 [https://perma.cc/78NX-AAKV] (“If
Chicago doesn’t fix the horrible ‘carnage’ going on, 228 shootings in 2017 with 42
killings (up 24% from 2016), I will send in the Feds!”).
